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Article IX, section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution directs that
the State use fines, penalties, and forfeitures collected for any breach of
state penal laws to maintain the public schools. This constitutional pro-
vision recently has been the subject of a great deal ofjudicial and legisla-
tive attention. This attention has raised fundamental questions about
the interpretation and application of article IX, section 7 Professor
Lawrence suggests that the North Carolina courts and general assembly
should resolve these questions of interpretation and application by view-
ing the provision in the manner of a statute, with a careful regard for the
intent of the drafters. He thereby analyzes the provision in light of the
historical circumstances surrounding its insertion into the North Caro-
lina Constitution and in light of court cases interpreting the provision
soon after its adoption. Professor Lawrence concludes that an interpre-
tation of article IX, section 7 in its historical context will increase signifi-
cantly the moneys going to local schools.
Article IX, section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution directs that "the
clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and of all fines collected in the
several counties for any breach of the penal laws of the State ... be... used
exclusively for maintaining free public schools."' This constitutional appropria-
tion of fines, penalties, and forfeitures has been part of the Constitution in gen-
eral form since 18682 and has been the subject of the State supreme court's
attention on many occasions. 3 Despite that attention, fundamental questions
continue to arise concerning the meaning and application of the provision. 4 In-
deed, the provision has been the focus of both judicial and legislative attention
during the past year.
For example, in 1985 in Cauble v. City of Asheville, the North Carolina
Supreme Court finally settled litigation against the city of Asheville that had
t Professor of Public Law and Government, The University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. A.B. Princeton University; J.D. Harvard University. I wish to thank Douglas Williams, now a
third year student at Duke University Law School, for his very helpful assistance on this Article.
1. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
2. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 5.
3. The court first addressed this constitutional provision in Katzenstein v. Raleigh & G.R.R.,
84 N.C. 688 (1881) and most recently in Cauble v. City of Asheville, 314 N.C. 598, 336 S.E.2d 59
(1985). Since Katzenstein the provision has been the subject of at least 20 court decisions.
4. The most significant unsettled issue under § 7 is the proper disposition of civil penalties that
the State collects for violation of state statutes. See infra text accompanying notes 128-39, 186-201.
The litigation in Cauble concerned only local government ordinance penalties and did not settle the
law with respect to state-imposed penalties.
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begun eight years earlier.5 In 1977 a taxpayer sued the city of Asheville, claim-
ing on behalf of the two school systems of Buncombe County the clear proceeds
of all moneys Asheville collected for violations of overtime parking ordinances.6
The North Carolina Supreme Court in 1980 held that Asheville's parking penal-
ties were subject to section 7.7 The court remanded the case to the trial court for
a determination of the "clear proceeds" of the parking penalties.8 In a 1985
appeal of the subsequent lower court proceedings on the question of "clear pro-
ceeds," the supreme court asked for reargument on the question it had decided
in 1980 and then reaffirmed the 1980 result.9
Numerous North Carolina statutes enforced by state agencies or officers
impose civil penalties for their violation. Examples include the environmental
statutes, 10 the unfair competition law,II the moral nuisance statute,12 and the
revenue laws. 13 These statutes either direct the application of the penalty pro-
ceeds to a noneducational use or are silent about their use, in which case the
proceeds have gone into the State's general fund. In 1985 budget leaders of the
State house introduced legislation to require that the State treasurer distribute
all such state-imposed penalties to counties for use by local school systems.14 As
5. 314 N.C. 598, 336 S.E.2d 59 (1985), affg 66 N.C. App. 537,311 S.E.2d 889 (1984), on later
appeal from 301 N.C. 340, 271 S.E.2d 258, aff'g in part and rev'g in part 45 N.C. App. 152, 263
S.E.2d 8 (1980).
6. Cauble, 45 N.C. App. at 156-57, 263 S.E.2d at 10-11.
7. Cauble, 301 N.C. at 344-45, 271 S.E.2d at 260-61. The court held that because the city
brought misdemeanor charges against those offenders who did not voluntarily pay their parking
tickets and because state law made violation of city ordinances a misdemeanor, the parking ordi-
nances were "penal laws of the State," and the penalties were therefore subject to article IX, § 7. Id.
For a detailed discussion of the question addressed in Cauble, see infra notes 202-228 and accompa-
nying text.
Although the Cauble litigation involved parking ordinances, the rationale of the decision ex-
tends to any city or county ordinance enforced by both civil penalties and criminal prosecution.
Until very recently parking ordinances were the only ordinances so enforced in most local govern-
ments in North Carolina.
8. Cauble, 301 N.C. at 345, 271 S.E.2d at 261.
9. Cauble, 314 N.C. at 598, 336 S.E.2d at 59.
10. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.6(a) (1983) (water quality); id. § 143-215.17(b) (water
use); id. § 143-215.36(b) (dam safety); id. § 143.215.91(a) (discharges of oil or other hazardous sub-
stances). None of these statutes makes any special appropriation of the proceeds of the penalties.
However, all of the proceeds apparently are placed into the State's General Fund. Telephone inter-
view with Barry K. Sanders, North Carolina Office of the State Budget (Oct. 7, 1986).
I1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-15.2 (1985). The amount of the penalty is to be paid to the State's
General Fund.
12. Id. § 19-6 (1983). Cities and counties in which the illegal activity occurred share equally
the moneys forfeited under this section. See State ex reL Gilchrist v. Cogdill, 74 N.C. App. 133, 327
S.E.2d 647 (1985) (judgment against defendant providing that the forfeited money was to be shared
equally by the city and the county).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-236 (1985) (setting out a series of penalties for violation of the laws
that raise revenues for state government).
14. H.B. 1079, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1985 Session (draft of May 16, 1985, available at U.N.C.
Inst. of Gov't). The two main sponsors were Representatives Watkins and Etheridge, who chaired
the two principal house appropriation committees. The bill would have amended N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 147-77 (1983 & Supp. 1985), which requires that a report be made to the State treasurer whenever
a state agency deposits funds into an official depository, by adding the following language:
The report to the State Treasurer shall identify each civil fine or penalty collected by
the State and the county in which the acts for which the fine or penalty was levied oc-
curred. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the State Treasurer shall pay these
funds to the county school fund in the county in which the acts for which the fine or
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introduced, the legislation passed only the house, but its sponsors were success-
ful in requiring state agencies to report to the 1986 legislature on the magnitude
of such penalties imposed and expended.
15
Another bill introduced in the State house in 1985 illustrates the continuing
legislative pressure to divert to noneducational purposes moneys that arguably
are subject to the constitutional provision. In June 1986 the North Carolina
General Assembly created a state level Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act that requires that property involved in racketeering forfeit to the
State. 16 If the bill had been enacted as originally proposed in 1985, the major
portion of the proceeds from this property was to be given to law enforcement
agencies for their operating expenses.17
Furthermore, in 1985 the general assembly defined one phrase in article IX,
section 7. Chapter 779, ratified the day before adjournment, defines "clear pro-
ceeds" as the full amount of fines, penalties, and forfeitures collected, "dimin-
ished only by the actual costs of collections, not to exceed ten percent of the
amount collected."'18 This new legislation directly affected the continuing litiga-
tion against the city of Asheville, because the definition of clear proceeds was
one of the enduring issues in that case. 19
This judicial and legislative attention to the fines, penalties, and forfeitures
provision of the North Carolina Constitution promises to continue and therefore
makes a review and analysis of the provision timely. The approach taken in this
Article is historical and comparative. At least seventeen other states have or
have had comparable constitutional provisions, most of them products of the
mid to late nineteenth century.20 These fines, penalties, and forfeitures provi-
penalty was levied occurred. If the acts occurred in more than one county, the State Treas-
urer shall divide the funds equally among the counties in which the acts occurred. The
counties shall use these funds for the purpose set out in article IX, Section 7 of the
Constitution.
Under current practice moneys subject to § 7 are first turned over to the finance officer of the appro-
priate county. The finance officer then distributes the moneys to the finance officer or officers of each
of the school administrative units in that county. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-452 (1983) (clerk
of superior court to turn moneys over to county finance officer).
15. Act of July 18, 1985, ch. 791, § 54, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1321, 1335.
16. North Carolina Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), H.B. 829,
N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1985 Session (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D).
17. See H.B. 829, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1985 Session (draft of May 3, 1985, available at U.N.C.
Inst. of Gov't). The enacted version requires that the proceeds be given to the State treasury. See
North Carolina Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), H.B. 829, N.C. Gen.
Assembly, 1985 Session (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-50)(2), (4), (5), (7)).
18. Act of July 17, 1985, ch. 779, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1308 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-437 (1983 & Supp. 1985)).
19. In its most recent Cauble opinion, the supreme court permitted cities to deduct only costs
of collection, and not costs of enforcement, from gross proceeds. Cauble, 314 N.C. at 606, 336
S.E.2d at 64; see infra text accompanying notes 170-79. The new legislation imposes a 10% maxi-
mum on the amount of collection costs that cities may deduct. This maximum, however, applies
only prospectively, from July 17, 1985. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § I15C-437 (1983 & Supp. 1985). A
city still may claim a larger deduction for collection costs on penalties collected before that date, and
the Cauble litigation itself was remanded to the superior court for a final determination of allowable
collection costs related to those earlier proceeds. Cauble, 314 N.C. at 601, 606, 336 S.E.2d at 61, 64.
20. Twelve other states currently have comparable provisions in their constitutions. See IND.
CONsT. art. 8, § 2; MICH. CONS'. art. VIII, § 9; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5;
NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 3; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 4; N.D. CONST. art. IX, § 2; S.D. CONST. art.
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sions are in reality statutes that are given constitutional status. These provisions
do not embody broad notions of civil liberties such as due process clauses or
basic allocations of governmental power such as separation of power clauses.
Rather, they represent specific decisions on narrow issues of public concern that
their proponents were able to insert into the state constitutions rather than the
statute books. For this reason, these constitutional provisions are more appro-
priately interpreted as statutes, with careful regard for their drafters' legislative
intent, rather than as provisions embodying broad notions of policy, which ap-
propriately are responsive to developing concepts of liberty, equality, and fair-
ness. John Marshall's reminder that "it is a constitution we are expounding" 21
therefore really does not apply to provisions such as section 7.
Thus, this Article argues that the intentions of the 1868 and 1875 drafters
of section 7 are very relevant to a determination of the current meaning of the
section. This Article seeks those intentions in the historical context in which
section 7 and comparable provisions became part of state constitutions; in
whatever fragmentary accounts there are that describe the proceedings of the
1868 and 1875 North Carolina conventions, and in the judicial decisions in the
years just before and just after the provision entered the North Carolina Consti-
tution. Those courts spoke the same legal language as the drafters of these pro-
visions in state constitutions and were aware of the conditions motivating the
placement of such provisions in state constitutions. Therefore, those early court
decisions should accurately mirror the intentions underlying section 7.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SECTION 7
A. The Literary Fund
North Carolina's original State Constitution, adopted in 1776, expressly
recognized the importance of government support of education. Section XLI
directed "[t]hat a school or schools shall be established by the Legislature for the
convenient Instruction of Youth, with such Salaries to the Masters paid by the
Public, as may enable them to instruct at low Prices; and all useful Learning
shall be duly encouraged and promoted in one or more Universities."' 22 The
general assembly acted quickly to establish a university, chartering the Univer-
sity of North Carolina in 1789.23 The establishment of a publicly-supported
school system, however, took much longer. The general assembly did not estab-
lish such a system until 1839.24
VIII, § 3; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 5; WIs. CONST. art. 10, § 2
(amended 1982); WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 5. In addition, five states at one time, but no longer, in-
cluded a comparable provision in their constitutions. See ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 4; FLA.
CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. 12, § 9 (amended 1926); IowA CONST. of
1846, art. IX, § 4; IOWA CONsT. art. IX, 2nd, § 4 (1857, repealed 1974); KAN. CONSr. art. VI, § 6
(1859, amended 1966); MIss. CONST. of 1869, art. VIII, § 6. Three states allocate to education the
proceeds of "escheats and forfeitures." See OR. CONsT. art. VIII, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 3;
WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 3.
21. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
22. N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XLI.
23. Act of Dec. 22, 1789, ch. 20, 1715-1804 N.C. Laws 472.
24. Act of Jan. 8, 1839, ch. 8, 1838-39 N.C. Laws 12.
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The delay in establishing a school system arose from the rejection of two
principles that are firmly established in modem public policy.
The first of these is the democratic principle that education is the func-
tion of the state rather than a family or parental obligation and that the
responsibility of providing the means of education rests primarily with
the state. The other principle is that the state has the right and the
power to raise by taxation . . . sufficient funds for adequate school
suppGrt.
25
The rejection was not unique to North Carolina; indeed, antagonism to public
education and to tax-based support of such education was widespread in the
nineteenth century.26 Consequently, states commonly sought to finance educa-
tion through permanent endowment funds, funded with revenues other than
taxes. 27 These states would use the income from such a fund to establish and
support public schools.
In 1825 North Carolina followed this route and became the twelfth state to
establish a permanent endowment fund-the Literary Fund.28 The major
source of money for North Carolina's new Literary Fund was dividends from
bank stock held by the State. Other sources included dividends from stock in
navigation companies, certain license taxes, and proceeds from the sale of
swamp lands. The income from the Fund was to provide "for the support of
common and convenient Schools for the instruction of youth .... ,
29
The Fund, however, was initially inadequate to meet this legislative goal,
and its administration aggravated the problem. The growth of principal was
painfully slow, and in 1831 it totaled less than 75,000 dollars.30 In addition,
both the Fund trustees and the general assembly believed that it was appropriate
to use Fund principal and income to support internal improvements and even to
lend money to the State treasury.31 As a result, no money remained for public
education.
Finally, in 1838 a change in state political leadership and a windfall from
the federal government led to a significant increase in Literary Fund assets.
32
25. E. KNIGHT, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH 161 (1922).
26. F. SwIFr, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC PERMANENT COMMON SCHOOL FUNDS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1795-1905 3-5 (1911).
27. Id. at 5.
28. Act of Jan. 4, 1826, ch. 1268, § 1, 1821-25 N.C. Laws 167, 167 (J. Taylor rev. 1827). The
first state to establish a permanent fund was Connecticut in 1795. The other states that established
permanent funds before 1825 were Delaware (1796), New York (1805), Tennessee (1806), Virginia
(1810), Maryland (1813), Indiana (1816), New Jersey (1817), Georgia (1817), New Hampshire
(1821), and Kentucky (1821). See F. SWIFT, supra note 26, at 207-436 (summarizing the origin and
present condition and administration of permanent funds in these states).
29. Act of Jan. 4, 1826, ch. 1268, § 1, 1821-25 N.C. Laws 167, 167 (J. Taylor rev. 1827).
30. E. KNIGHT, supra note 25, at 90.
31. Boyd, The Finances of the North Carolina Literary Fund, 13 S. ATL. Q. 270, 275-76 (1914).
32. State constitutional changes in 1835 shifted political power from the east towards the west
of North Carolina, and consequently, the Whig party came to power in 1836. The Whigs were
committed to internal improvements and public education as tools to increase the economic well-
being of the State. At approximately the same time the Whigs came to power in North Carolina, the
federal government's budget was in surplus, with revenues continuing to outstrip expenditures. Con-
gress decided to distribute the surplus among the several states, and North Carolina's share was
$1,433,757.39. H. LEFLAR & A. NEWSOME, NORTH CAROLINA 359-62 (3d ed. 1973).
1986]
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When the federal government distributed its surplus revenues to the states,
North Carolina used 300,000 dollars of its share to increase the Literary Fund's
principal. 33 In addition, the general assembly added 600,000 dollars of state-
owned railroad stock, 700,000 dollars of state-owned bank stock, and sufficient
other moneys to increase Fund assets by over 1,700,000 dollars. By 1840 Fund
principal was valued at almost 2,250,000 dollars.
3 4
In 1839 the general assembly finally acted to establish a state-supported
system of common schools. 35 As amended two years later,36 the plan distrib-
uted Literary Fund income among the counties on a per capita basis. Under the
plan each county was obliged to raise locally an amount equal to at least one-
half its Literary Fund allocation.3 7 Although the State continued to borrow
money from the Literary Fund for general government purposes,3 8 much of the
money did find its way to local school systems. By the late 1850s North Caro-
lina had a relatively respectable system of schools. By the eve of the Civil War,
the average school term in North Carolina was four months, a level that was
soon lost to the strains of the War and that, because of the economic destruction
of the war and reconstruction, was not regained until 1900.
39
The Civil War proved disastrous to public education in North Carolina.
Although state and local taxation had become an accepted method of financing
schools, many counties diverted tax moneys from education to war-related ex-
penditures.4° In addition, the Literary Fund was essentially destroyed. Much of
the Fund's principal was invested in state and Confederate bonds issued to fund
the war effort. When the war was lost, the state bonds were repudiated and the
Confederate bonds were worthless. 4 1 Most of the remaining Fund assets had
been invested with banks that had themselves purchased large amounts of Con-
federate bonds. When these bonds failed, the banks failed, and Fund assets were
lost. 42 In 1866 the total income of the Literary Fund was only 766 dollars.43
Against this background, the Reconstruction Constitution of 1868 replaced
the statutorily based Literary Fund with a constitutionally based "irreducible
educational fund," the annual income of which could be used only "for estab-
lishing and perfecting... a system of free public schools." 44 The Constitution
placed in this new fund not only the remaining assets of the Literary Fund but
33. E. KNIGHT, supra note 25, at 95. The State used another $200,000 of its share to drain
swamp lands and appropriated the income from sales of the drained land to the Literary Fund. Id.
34. E. KNIGHT, supra note 25, at 95.
35. Act of Jan. 8, 1839, ch. 8, 1838-39 N.C. Laws 12.
36. Act of Jan. 11, 1841, ch. 7, 1840-43 N.C. Laws 11.
37. The original act called for a local tax levy in each school district sufficient to raise $20; the
Literary Fund then matched that with $40 more. See Act of Jan. 8, 1839, ch. 8, 1838-39 N.C. Laws
12. The amended version required a comparable match of state to local funds, but did not limit the
state share to $40 per district. See Act of Jan. 11, 1841, ch. 7, 1840-43 N.C. Laws 11.
38. Boyd, supra note 31, at 362-63.
39. E. KNIGHT, supra note 25, at 175; H. LEFLAR & A. NEwsOME, supra note 32, at 530-39.
40. Boyd, supra note 31, at 368.
41. Boyd, supra note 31, at 370.
42. Boyd, supra note 31, at 369-70.
43. Boyd, supra note 31, at 369-70.
44. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 4. The entire section read as follows:
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also the proceeds of several recurring revenues, including "the net proceeds that
may accrue to the State... from fines, penalties and forfeitures."
45
B. The Background of the 1868 Constitutional Provision
The irreducible educational fund established in the 1868 Constitution both
continued and changed existing state policy. The new educational fund was in
one sense an expanded version of the 1825 Literary Fund. However, a statute
had established the Literary Fund;46 the Constitution established the new educa-
tional fund. In addition, the Literary Fund had derived most of its principal
from extraordinary revenues, while the new fund relied, in part, on the recurring
revenue source of fines, penalties, and forfeitures. The revenues from fines, pen-
alties, and forfeitures were a source that had not heretofore been earmarked for
education. Why, it must be asked, were the changes made? -
At one level that question is impossible to answer. The only recorded de-
bate on education in the 1868 Constitutional Convention focused on whether the
Constitution should require that public schools be segregated. 47 The sources of
and policies behind the rest of the Constitution's provision for education, includ-
ing the new endowment fund, are lost in the unrecorded committee delibera-
tions.48 On a more general level, however, reasons for the changes can be
suggested.
The constitutionalization of the endowment fund probably was an attempt
to insulate the fund's principal and income from diversion to noneducational
purposes. As noted above, the forty year history of the Literary Fund was
dotted with instances of diversion. Given the Republicans' general enthusiasm
The proceeds of all lands that have been, or hereafter may be granted by the United
States to this State and not otherwise specially appropriated by the United States or hereto-
fore by this State; also, all moneys, stocks, bonds, and other property now belonging to any
fund for purposes of education; also, the net proceeds that may accrue to the State from
sales of estrays, or from fines, penalties and forfeitures; also, the proceeds of all sales of the
swamp lands belonging to the State; also, all money that shall be paid as an equivalent for
exemption from military duty; also, all grants, gifts or devises that may hereafter be made
to this State, and not otherwise appropriated by the grant, gift or devise, shall be securely
invested, and sacredly preserved as an irreducible educational fund, the annual income of
which, together with so much of the ordinary revenue of the State as may be necessary,
shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and perfecting in this State a system of Free
Public Schools, and for no other purposes or uses whatsoever.
Id.
45. Id.
46. Act of Jan. 4, 1826, ch. 1868, § 1, 1821-25 N.C. Laws 167, 167 (J. Taylor rev. 1827); see
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
47. Unsuccessful efforts were made in the convention to include in the new Constitution a
requirement that public schools be segregated by race. N.C. JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1868, at 342-43. Comparable efforts succeeded in the 1875 Convention, which
added the following language to the North Carolina Constitution: "And the children of the white
race and the children of the colored race shall be taught in separate public schools; but there shall be
no discrimination in favor of, or to the prejudice, of either race." N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2
(amended 1875). This language remained in the Constitution until the adoption of the present Con-
stitution in 1970. See N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 7.
48. The published journal of the 1868 Convention contains no record of actual debate. How-
ever, two Raleigh newspapers published daily accounts of the debates. See North Carolina Standard
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 29, 1868, at 2; Daily Sentinel (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 21, 1868, at 2, col. 1.
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for publicly supported education4 9 and the depleted status of the Fund, it is not
surprising that the convention sought to protect, as much as possible, the new
endowment fund from the same history of diversion. Other states had given
their common school funds constitutional protection for the same reasons.50
The meager resources of the Literary Fund, which were the core of the new
educational fund, may also explain the constitutional allocation of fines, penal-
ties, and forfeitures to the fund. The new educational fund needed to build its
assets because only its income was available for expenditure. Further, the exper-
iences of other states may have suggested that fines, penalties, and forfeitures
were good sources of assets.51
In 1868 the allocation of fines and, less often, of penalties and forfeitures to
education had a history almost as long as that of common school funds. The
earliest allocation of these revenues seems to have been in Virginia in 1810. In
that year Virginia established by statute a Literary Fund and included among its
funding sources "any fine, penalty or forfeiture which has been or may be im-
posed, or which may accrue .... -52 Over the next half-century other states
turned to the same source to fund education. Indiana was the first to constitu-
tionalize the allocation. Its 1816 Constitution provided that "all fines assessed
for any breach of the penal laws" be used to support county seminaries. 53 In
1851 Indiana amended this provision, perhaps in response to an 1848 court deci-
sion, to add to the common school fund "all forfeitures which may accrue."
'54
In 1835 the provision for education in the Michigan Constitution set aside "the
clear proceeds of all fines assessed in the several counties for any breach of the
penal laws" for local libraries;55 Iowa, in 1846, and Wisconsin, in 1848, used
language almost identical to Michigan 's to help fund common schools. 56 Thus,
by the Civil War there was a limited precedent in the neighboring state of Vir-
49. H. LEFLAR & A. NEWSOME, supra note 32, at 531-32. The Republicans dominated the
convention and controlled State government for the next few years.
50. Several states that constitutionalized their common school funds about the same time as
North Carolina-Arkansas, Missouri, and Mississippi-had comparable histories of mismanage-
ment and loss. F. SWIFr, supra note 26, at 217, 322-23, & 326-27.
51. For example, "[t]he proceeds from fines and forfeitures have added more to the principal of
the Common School Fund in Indiana than the proceeds from the seven other sources provided by
law." F. SWIFT, supra note 26, at 87-88.
52. Act of Feb. 2, 1810, ch. 44, § 1, 1808 Rev. Code of Va. Acts 48, 49 (Supp. 1812); see W.
MADDOX, THE FREE SCHOOL IDEA IN VIRGINIA BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 48 (1918).
53. IND. CONST. of 1816, art. IX, § 3. The moneys were not placed in an endowment fund, but
were used to support current operations.
54. IND. CONST. art. 8, § 2.
The case was Common Council v. Fairchild, I Ind. 315 (1848). The court in Fairchild held that
the 1816 constitutional provision applied only to criminal actions, because only the word "fines" was
used: "It is probable, that if the proceeds arising from civil suits ... had been intended to be
embraced by the constitution, the words fines and penalties, or fines and forfeitures, instead of the
word 'fines,' would have been used." Id. at 318. If the purpose of the 1851 change was to extend the
reach of the provision to civil suits, it was unsuccessful. In 1892 the Indiana Supreme Court held
that the constitutional provision still extended only to criminal actions. State v. Indiana & I.S.R.R.,
133 Ind. 69, 32 N.E. 817 (1892). Perhaps only bail bond forfeitures were added by the 1851 amend-
ment. See State v. Elliott, 171 Ind. App. 389, 357 N.E.2d 276 (1977).
55. MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. X, § 4.
56. IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. IX, § 4; Wis. CONsT. art. 10, § 2. Wisconsin's Constitution was
the first to place these moneys in an endowment fund.
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ginia and in several states of the Midwest for allocating fines, and sometimes
penalties and forfeitures, to education.
The specific model for North Carolina's provision, however, appears to
have come from Missouri. Missouri adopted a new Constitution in 1865, and
the common school provision in that document is remarkably similar to the
provision included in North Carolina's 1868 Constitution. 57 There appears to
be no common model for the two states' provisions, and thus it is likely that the
North Carolina Convention used the Missouri provision as a model. Republi-
cans dominated both conventions, 58 and perhaps an informal network linked
Republican party members in different states.59 Whatever the relation, in 1868
North Carolina joined those states that constitutionally allocated fines, penalties,
and forfeitures to support the public schools.
C. From 1868 to 1875
The irreducible educational fund established in the 1868 Constitution lasted
only seven years. In 1875 the Conservatives, 60 who had gained control of state
government and politics, forced a constitutional convention, primarily to repeal
57. Compare N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 4, with Mo. CONsT. of 1865, art. IX, § V. North
Carolina's Constitution provided as follows:
The proceeds of all lands that have been or hereafter may be granted by the United
States to this State, and not otherwise appropriated by this State or the United States; also,
all moneys, stocks, bonds, and other property now belonging to any State fund for pur-
poses of education; also the net proceeds of all sales of the swamp lands belonging to the
State, and all other grants, gifts or devises, that have been or hereafter may be made to this
State and not otherwise appropriated by the State or by the term of the grant, gift or devise,
shall be paid into the State treasury; and, together with so much of the ordinary revenue of
the State as may be by law set apart for that purpose, shall be faithfully appropriated for
establishing and maintaining in this State a system of free public schools, and for no other
uses or purposes whatsoever.
In comparison, Missouri's Constitution provided as follows:
The proceeds of all lands that have been, or hereafter may be granted by the United
States to this state, and not otherwise appropriated by this state or the United States; also,
all moneys, stocks, bonds, lands and other property now belonging to any fund for pur-
poses of education; also, the net proceeds of all sales of lands, and other property and
effects that may accrue to the state by escheat, or from sales of estrays, or from unclaimed
dividends, or distributive shares of the estates of deceased persons, or from fines, penalties,
and forfeitures; also, any proceeds of the sales of the public lands which may have been or
hereafter may be paid over to this state, (if congress will consent to such appropriation);
also, all other grants, gifts, or devises that have been or hereafter may be made to this state,
and not otherwise appropriated by the terms of the grant, gift, or devise, shall be securely
invested and sacredly preserved as a public school fund, the annual income of which fund,
together with so much of the ordinary revenue of the state as may be necessary, shall be
faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining the free schools and the university
in this article provided for, and for no other uses or purposes whatsoever.
58. W. PARRISH, C. JONES & L. CHRISTENSEN, MISSOURI, THE HEART OF THE NATION 190
(1980).
59. The Arkansas Constitution of 1868, also authored by a Republican-dominated convention,
see H. ASHMORE, ARKANSAS 91-92 (1978), also contained a provision apparently modeled on the
Missouri document. ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 4.
60. The Reconstruction opponents of the Republicans called themselves Conservatives. In
1876 the national resurgence of the Democratic party caused the North Carolina Conservatives to
rename their party the North Carolina Democratic party. H. LEFLAR & A. NEWSOME, supra note
32, at 488, 500.
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some of the most objectionable provisions of the 1868 document. 61 However,
the 1875 Convention also proposed other changes unrelated to partisan prefer-
ences, one of which was a revision of the education funding provisions. 62 The
1875 Convention abolished the permanent endowment fund and earmarked
most of its resources, except fines, penalties, and forfeitures, as current state rev-
enues for public education. 63 In addition, for the first time the convention con-
stitutionally allocated certain moneys for public education directly to local
government; these moneys did not have to pass through the State treasury.
Among the moneys were "the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures, and
of all fines collected in the several counties for any breach of the penal or mili-
tary laws of the State." 64
As was true of the 1868 change, no accurate record exists explaining the
1875 changes.65 However, events in the years between 1868 and 1875 suggest
several reasons that are helpful in understanding the meaning of the 1875 lan-
guage, which is essentially the language in the State's present Constitution.
66
The drafters of the constitutional endowment fund apparently had intended
the fund to supplement local funding for education, much as the Literary Fund
61. The most important changes were to return control of county government from county
voters to the general assembly, thus assuring white and Conservative control of county government,
H. LEFLAR & NEWSOME, supra note 32, at 500, and to require, by constitutional mandate, segre-
gated schools, see supra note 47.
62. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 5 (amended 1875). The section read as follows:
All moneys, stocks, bonds, and other property, belonging to a county school fund;
also, the net proceeds from the sale of estrays; also, the clear proceeds of all penalties and
forfeitures, and of all fines collected in the several counties for any breach of the penal or
military laws of the State; and all moneys which shall be paid by persons as an equivalent
for exemption from military duty, shall belong to and remain in the several counties, and
shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining free public schools in the
several counties of this State: Provided, that the amount collected in each county shall be
annually reported to the Superintendent of Public Instruction.
When the Constitution was rewritten in 1970, the reference to "military laws" was dropped. The
term probably encompassed those laws regulating the state militia, which provided for fines and
other sanctions upon conviction in a court martial.
63. See id. § 4. With only minor changes, this provision was brought forward in the 1970
Constitution. N.C. CoNsr. art. IX, § 6.
64. N.C. CoNsT. of 1868, art. IX, § 5 (amended 1875).
65. Oddly, the Missouri connection continued. Missouri also had a political reaction, and the
conservatives in that state also forced an 1875 Constitutional Convention. That convention shifted
fines, penalties, and forfeitures to the counties, and the language used was, again, very much like
North Carolina's:
Section 8. County School funds, whence derived.
All moneys, stocks, bonds, lands, and other property belonging to a county school
fund; also, the net proceeds from the sale of estrays; also, the clear proceeds of all penalties
and forfeitures, and of all fines collected in the several counties for any breach of the penal
or military laws of the State and all moneys which shall be paid by persons as an equivalent
for exemption from military duty, shall belong to, and be securely invested, and sacredly
preserved in the several counties, as a county public school fund; the income of which fund
shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining free public schools in the
several counties of this State.
Mo. CONST. of 1875, art. XI, § 8. When the Missouri Constitution was revised again in 1945, the
language relating to fines, penalties, and forfeitures was modified. Mo. CONsT. art. IX, § 7.
66. The 1970 Constitution deleted the reference to "military laws" and deleted a comma after
the word forfeitures. Compare N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7 with N.C. CoNST. of 1868, art. IX, § 5
(amended 1875).
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had done before the Civil War.67 The North Carolina General Assembly gave
this responsibility to the endowment fund in comprehensive school legislation
enacted in 1869.68 However, despite the constitutional command that counties
support local school systems, the supreme court held in 1871 that counties could
not levy township school taxes without voter approval. 69 Given the general an-
tagonism towards levying taxes for education, this decision made it practically
impossible for counties to meet their obligations under the 1869 statute and later
statutes.70 By 1874 the average school term was estimated at only ten weeks.
71
Thus, one likely purpose of the 1875 change was to shift a steady source of
income-fines, penalties, and forfeitures-to the counties to assist them in sup-
porting public schools.
Moreover, during the period from 1868 to 1875 State government remained
unable to keep its hands off the endowment fund. Despite the constitutional
command that the fund's assets were to be used for public schools "and for no
other uses or purposes whatsoever,"' 72 the State continued to divert moneys, at
least temporarily, from the Fund to other purposes. 73 Because of this diversion
and because the fund began with very few assets, the income of the fund was
quite small during the 1868-1875 period. As a result, little State money was
reaching the local schools.
Statutory changes made in the early 1870s that presaged the constitutional
changes of 1875 reflected these difficulties. In 1869 the general assembly pro-
vided that seventy-five percent of the state and county poll tax was to be paid
into the State treasury to increase the principal of the educational fund.74 In
1870 the general assembly levied a statewide property tax of one-twelfth of one
percent to fund an 1869 appropriation for schools of 100,000 dollars. 75 In 1871
the general assembly amended the 1869 poll tax legislation to keep the proceeds
in the county of collection, rather than returning them to the State for redistri-
bution.76 Further, in 1872 the general assembly again levied a statewide prop-
erty tax and this time retained its proceeds in the county of collection.
77
Newspaper accounts of the debate accompanying the 1871 changes are illu-
minating. The comments of various senators in the debate indicate two points.
First, because some banks refused to lend to the State, the State relied on the
67. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
68. Act of Apr. 12, 1869, ch. 184, 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 458.
69. Lane v. Stanly, 65 N.C. 153 (1871). In 1871 the Constitution permitted the levy of taxes
without voter approval only for "necessary expenses." N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VII, § 7. In Lane
the court held that schools were not a necessary expense. Lane, 65 N.C. at 154.
70. E. KNIGHT, PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 248-49 (1916); M. No-
BLE, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF NORTH CAROLINA 327-28 (1930).
71. E. KNIGHT, supra note 70, at 260.
72. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 4 (amended 1875).
73. E.g., Auditor's Statement for 1870, Statement B, 1870-71 N.C. Pub. Laws 517, 543 (show-
ing loans from this fund to the University of North Carolina and to the Institution for the Deaf and
Dumb and Blind).
74. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 184, § 52, 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 458, 471.
75. Act of Mar. 28, 1870, ch. 229, class 1, § 2, 1869-70 N.C. Pub. Laws 297, 299.
76. Act of Apr. 5, 1871, ch. 237, § 5, 1870-71 N.C. Pub. Laws 387, 387-88.
77. Act of Feb. 10, 1872, ch. 189, § 38, 1871-72 N.C. Pub. Laws 308, 318.
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moneys in the educational fund as a source of short-term borrowed funds.78
Second, because of this use of the educational fund and for other unspecified
technical reasons,7 9 local schools were not receiving income from the fund. As a
result, some counties had no public schools. 80 Several senators argued for the
shift from state control to local retention as a means of getting at least some
money to local schools.
81
Thus, the 1875 Convention met in a context of declining confidence in the
statewide educational fund and several years' experience of shifting school-re-
lated revenue sources from central state collection to retention in the county of
collection. The two major 1875 changes continued the statutory pattern: the
concept of a permanent educational fund was eliminated from the Constitution,
and the county of collection rather than the State retained the proceeds of fines,
penalties, and forfeitures.
II. ANALYSIS OF SEcTION 7
Article IX, section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution currently states, in
relevant part, that "the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and of all
fines collected in the several counties for any breach of the penal laws of the
State" shall be used for public school purposes.82 The remainder of this Article
discusses the following elements of this language: (1) "penal laws"; (2) "penal-
ties, .... forfeitures," and "fines"; (3) "clear proceeds"; and (4) "collected in the
several counties." The discussion focuses on the meaning of these words and
phrases that was prevalent in the late nineteenth century when "fines, penalties,
and forfeitures" provisions entered several state constitutions in a brief span of
years. The remainder of the Article also discusses the applicability of section 7
to violations of local ordinances and infractions.
A. "Penal Laws"
The county school fund consists of fines, penalties, and forfeitures collected
for breaches of the "penal laws of the State." 83 This section discusses the mean-
ing of "penal laws" and whether that term refers only to criminal laws or has a
broader meaning.
78. Raleigh Daily Telegram, Mar. 22, 1871, at 2, col. 2.
79. Senator Gilmer, floor manager of the bill, reportedly stated that money was held by the
State treasurer for schools, but "[could not] be had [by counties] unless under certain technicalities,
difficult to comply with." Id. at 2, col. 3. Gilmer did not disclose the nature of the technicalities.
80. Senator Cowles, who lived in Yadkin County and represented Yadkin and Surry Counties
in the Senate, see 1870-71 N.C. Pub. Laws viii (list of senators by county), was reported as saying
that the schools in his county had been closed. Raleigh Daily Telegram, Mar. 22, 1871, at 2, col. 3.
The Daily Telegram reported Senator Gilmer as responding to Cowles' remarks by stating that the
"state of affairs mentioned by Mr. Cowles, prevails generally over the State." Id.
81. Raleigh Daily Telegram, Mar. 22, 1871, at 2, col. 3. These changes from state to local
control also probably changed the distribution pattern of the moneys. Counties that contributed
heavily to the statewide fund because of high property values or large numbers of taxable males may
not have had comparably large numbers of school age children, the basis on which statewide moneys
were distributed.
82. N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 7.
83. Id.
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The Constitution itself does not define "penal laws," nor has any reported
case involving section 7 turned on the meaning of those words. Therefore, one
must look to the meaning given the term in other contexts and to the policy of
the provision to determine its meaning in section 7. Although courts have had
to define the term "penal laws" in several contexts, the following two contexts
have most frequently demanded definition: First, determining the reach of John
Marshall's maxim that "[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of
another";8 4 and second, executing the interpretative principle that penal laws
are strictly construed.
85
There are, not surprisingly, common elements of meaning in both contexts.
Generally, "penal laws" in both contexts are laws that impose a monetary pay-
ment for their violation. 86 This payment is punitive rather than remedial; it is
intended to punish the wrongdoer rather than compensate the victim of the vio-
lation.8 7 Because a single law can contain both punitive and remedial ele-
ments, 88 lines between penal and remedial laws can be difficult to draw, but the
underlying distinction is well established and remains reasonable.
Recently, however, the differing policies underlying the two contexts have
led toward differences in the meaning accorded "penal laws." Because the mod-
em policy is to open the courts of one state to claims based on the laws of
another state,8 9 the meaning of "penal laws" in the first context has tended to
84. Marshall's comment was made in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825). The
doctrine summarized by the maxim is discussed in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
Although Marshall made the comment in the context of international law, it also applies to enforce-
ment of the laws of one American state by another. Id.
85. See generally 3 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 59.03 (4th ed. 1974) (discussing the strict construction of penal laws).
Two other contexts that have necessitated definition of "penal laws" are (1) the doctrine that
equity will not ordinarily restrain violation of a penal law, e.g., International Ass'n of Cleaning &
Dye House Workers v. Landowitz, 20 Cal. 2d 418, 126 P.2d 609 (1942); and (2) special statutes of
limitations for claims based on penal laws, eg., Cruickshanks v. Eak, 33 N.J. Super. 285, 110 A.2d
61 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1954).
86. E.g., Adams v. Fitchburg R.R., 67 Vt. 76, 30 A. 687 (1894) (penalty for wrongful death,
with amount of penalty varying with culpability of defendant, is imposed as punishment; therefore
statute is penal and will not be enforced by court of another state); Hall v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 44 W.
Va. 36, 28 S.E. 754 (1897) (fixed penalty for overcharges in freight by railroad imposed as punish-
ment; therefore, statute is penal and must be strictly construed).
87. See Newman v. George A. Fuller Co., 72 R.I. 113, 48 A.2d 345 (1946) (Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act compensates victims and is therefore remedial rather than penal).
88. Examples include antitrust statutes that permit a range of enforcement and remedial ac-
tions, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-13 to -16 (1985), and contempt actions, in which fines may have
both remedial and punitive purposes, eg., Holloway v. People's Water Co., 100 Kan. 414, 167 P. 265
(1917).
89. The rule prohibiting a state from adjudicating a claim based on the laws of another state
was subjected to academic criticism over a half-century ago. See Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of
Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1932), in which the author urged that the
rule was not rationally supportable in its broad application and urged that it be limited to criminal
laws. By 1977 Leflar was able to report a general acceptance of his views:
Actually, most American states have broken away from the old rule which excluded local
enforcement of extrastate penal and governmental claims. A principal means by which
they did so is by redefinition of the word "penal," so as to confine it more strictly to the
criminal law as such .... Though the penalty rule is not dead, it has only a fraction of the
strength that it possessed at the turn of the century.
R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 49, at 92 (3d ed. 1977).
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narrow in recent years. In many jurisdictions the "penal laws" have become
identical to the criminal laws. 90 However, nineteenth century courts remained
likely to extend this nonenforcement doctrine beyond the criminal law,9 1 and it
is the nineteenth century meaning that was familiar to the drafters of section 7.
The policies underlying the context of statutory construction have tended
to pull the other way, broadening the meaning given "penal laws." The courts
have been solicitous towards those whom the law seeks to punish, concerned
that the offense involved be clearly defined and that those charged be protected
against arbitrary enforcement. 92 Thus, the term "penal laws" in this second
context extends far beyond the criminal laws. The courts characterize a law as
penal if the law imposes a monetary payment on anyone violating its terms and
if the purpose of that payment is punishment.93 Indeed, the courts have ex-
tended the principle to laws that impose various forms of economic losses on
violators beyond simple payment of money.
94
An expansive rather than a restrictive understanding of the term "penal
laws" better furthers the probable policy behind section 7-to assist in supplying
a stable and sufficient source of funds for local school systems. For this reason
and because the restrictive trend of definition in the enforcement context has
been largely a twentieth century phenomenon, it is likely that section 7's drafters
intended "penal laws" to include much more than the criminal laws. For sec-
tion 7 purposes, the better understanding is that any law imposing a monetary
payment for punishment on a violator of that law is a penal law.
Case law roughly contemporary with the adoption of the 1875 language
supports this understanding. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has
not had direct occasion to define "penal laws" in a section 7 case, the court's
early cases addressing section 7 indicate an expansive understanding. Both
Katzenstein v. Raleigh & Gaston Railroad9 5 and State ex rel. Hodge v. Marietta
& North Georgia Railroad96 involved statutory penalties recoverable by civil,
rather than criminal actions. In both cases the court apparently assumed that
90. R. LEFLAR, supra note 89, § 49, at 92-95.
91. See R. MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10 (1901).
So far as private international law is concerned, it matters not whether that punish-
ment is inflicted through the instrumentality of an ordinary prosecution by the state's of-
ficers for a fine, or through the medium of a civil action by the party injured for penal
damages. In substance it is an act of punishment; it is punitive in either case.
Id. at 24.
92. 3 C. SANDS, supra note 85, § 59.03, at 7-8.
93. 3 C. SANDS, supra note 85, § 59.01, at 1.
94. 3 C. SANDS, supra note 85, § 59.02, at 4-5, which includes the following examples of penal
laws: professional licensing statutes, the violation of which is punished by revocation of the viola-
tor's license, Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. McClellan, 307 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Ct. App.
1957); a statute that denied access to the state courts by any foreign corporation that did not register
with the state, Clymer v. Zane, 128 Ohio St. 359, 191 N.E. 123 (1934); and divorce statutes that
permitted entry of judicial orders in divorce proceedings prohibiting one or both partners from re-
marrying within a specified period of time, Olsen v. Olsen, 27 Misc. 2d 555, 209 N.Y.S.2d 503 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1960).
95. 84 N.C. 688 (1881). Katzenstein was the first § 7 case the North Carolina Supreme Court
decided.
96. 108 N.C. 24, 12 S.E. 1041 (1891).
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the penalties in question were potentially subject to section 7. This assumption
necessarily meant that the court also assumed that the laws imposing the penal-
ties were penal.
97
Moreover, courts of other states with comparable constitutional provisions,
with one exception, reached the same expansive interpretation of "penal laws."
The Missouri Supreme Court in 187898 and the Kansas Supreme Court in
187999 expressly defined "penal laws" to include laws enforced by civil remedies.
In each case the crucial characteristic was the law's imposition of a monetary
penalty to punish the violator. 10° In addition, the courts of Mississippi in 1875
and Wisconsin in 1870 assumed that such laws were penal in interpreting the
constitutional provisions of those states.' 0 1 The exception was Indiana, which
in 1848 decided that its constitutional provision extended only to criminal
laws.10 2 The peculiar phraseology and context of that provision, however,
weighed heavily in the Indiana court's decision.
10 3
One other distinction-that between "penal laws" and "revenue laws ' '-
might be relevant to the meaning of "penal laws" under section 7. There was
formerly a rule of international law that one state did not enforce the revenue
laws of another.'04 Because the courts have set aside this rule in recent years
and now enforce foreign revenue laws, the courts must now distinguish revenue
laws from penal laws.'0 5 If penal laws do not include revenue laws, it could be
97. In Branch v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 77 N.C. 347 (1877), the supreme court upheld the
statute involved in Katzenstein against constitutional attack and, in passing, characterized the statute
as a "penal statute." Id. at 353. The meaning of "penal statute" seems to have been a statute for the
violation of which a court imposed a penalty.
98. Barnett v. Atlantic & P.R.R., 68 Mo. 56 (1878).
99. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. State ex reL Sanders, 22 Kan. 1 (1879).
100. The Barnett court held that a statute requiring railroads to fence their tracks and providing
for double damages for stock killed as a result of violations was a penal law under the Missouri fines,
penalties, and forfeitures provision. Because double damages exceeded the amount necessary to
compensate the victim, the statute was penal. Barnett, 68 Mo. at 62-64. InAtchison a statute requir-
ing railroads to ring a bell or sound a whistle at crossings and providing a $20 civil penalty for each
violation was held to be a penal law under the Kansas fines, penalties, and forfeitures provision.
Atchison, 22 Kan. at 12-16.
101. Mobile & O.R.R. v. State, 51 Miss. 137 (1875) (statute requiring railroad to maintain warn-
ing sign at each crossing enforced by $50 civil penalty), overruled on other grounds by McLendon v.
Pass, 66 Miss. 110, 5 So. 234 (1888); Lynch v. The Steamer "Economy," 27 Wis. 69 (1870) (statute
requiring steamship companies to maintain devices to prevent the escape of sparks or burning cin-
ders enforced by $200 civil penalty).
102. Common Council v. Fairchild, 1 Ind. 315 (1848).
103. The court noted that another section of the State Constitution required the legislature to
formulate a "penal code." In that context "penal" was interpreted to mean "criminal." Therefore,
the court reasoned, the word must mean "criminal" in the school fund provision as well. Id. at 318-
19. Furthermore, the court noted that the Constitution earmarked only "fines" for the school fund.
"Fines" were commonly understood to be imposed only for violations of criminal laws. Id. at 318.
The Virginia Supreme Court has limited the reach of that state's provision to criminal laws.
Southern Express Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Walker, 92 Va. 59, 22 S.E. 809 (1895), aff'd per
curiam, 168 U.S. 705 (1897). However, the Virginia provision reads quite differently from the North
Carolina provision: "all fines collected for offenses committed against the Commonwealth ... 
VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8.
104. See Robertson, Extraterritorial Enforcement of Tax Obligations, 7 ARIz. L. REV. 219, 219
(1966).
105. E.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919
(1946); Buckely v. Huston, 60 N.J. 472, 291 A.2d 129 (1972).
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argued that penalties imposed for nonpayment of taxes or for other violations of
revenue statutes are not subject to section 7. However, even as the rule of non-
enforcement of revenue laws has eroded, courts and commentators have distin-
guished between the revenue-raising provisions of revenue laws and the penal
provisions of those laws.10 6 The courts continue to deny interstate enforcement
to the penal provisions of revenue laws on the ground that those provisions re-
main penal laws.' 0 7 This distinction makes good sense in the section 7 context.
No one would deny that a criminal fine that is imposed as punishment for a
criminal violation of the tax laws is subject to section 7. The appropriate sec-
tions of the tax laws are clearly penal. Using the alternative enforcement mecha-
nism of imposing a penalty in civil suit does not change the character of the
payment; it is still punishment, and for that reason the courts should consider
these laws penal.
B. "Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures"
Historically, neither courts nor legislatures have carefully distinguished be-
tween fines, penalties, and forfeitures. Rather, they have used the terms, espe-
cially fines and penalties, interchangeably to denote monetary payments imposed
as punishment for violations of law. This pattern of synonym, as opposed to
differentiation, is reflected in most of the state constitutions that earmark such
monetary payments for schools or other limited purposes. Of the nineteenth
century constitutional provisions, only those in North Carolina, Missouri, and
Arkansas used all three words-fines, penalties, and forfeitures. 10 8 It was much
more common for constitutions to mention only "fines."' 0 9 The courts, recog-
nizing the traditional looseness of usage, refused to differentiate between fines
and other payments. Instead, they extended the reach of the constitutional pro-
visions to all monetary payments imposed as punishment, regardless of how the
legislature labeled the payment and regardless of whether the proceeding was
criminal or civil. 110
106. Nelson v. Minnesota Income Tax Div., 429 P.2d 324 (Wyo. 1967); Robertson, supra note
104.
107. Nelson, 429 P.2d at 324 (Wyoming court allowed Minnesota to sue in Wyoming for unpaid
Minnesota income tax but not for statutory penalty imposed for late payment).
108. ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 4; MO. CONST. of 1865, art. IX, § V; N.C. CONST. of 1868,
art. IX, § 5 (amended 1875).
109. E.g., IOWA CONsT. art. IX, 2nd, § 4 (1857, repealed 1974) ("the clear proceeds of all fines
collected.., for any breach of the penal laws"); KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1859, amended 1966)
("the proceeds of fines for any breach of the penal laws"); Wis. CONST. art. X, § 2 ("the clear
proceeds of all fines collected ... for any breach of the penal laws").
110. The looseness of usage is well illustrated by Lynch v. The Steamer "Economy," 27 Wis. 69
(1870). The Wisconsin Constitution gave the "clear proceeds of all fines" to a permanent school
fund. WIs. CoNsT. art. 10, § 2. The court held that the provision applied to a civil penalty awarded
in a qui tam action and in the course of the opinion equated penalties and forfeitures: "It is a general
rule, that a common informer cannot sue for a penalty unless authorized so to do so by statute; but
many cases hold, where the statute gives the forfeiture, or a part of it ...." Id. at 71 (emphasis
added).
Other cases demonstrating this point include Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. State ex rel. Sanders,
22 Kan. 1, 25-26 (1879) ("fines" includes civil penalties); Mobile & O.R.R. v. State, 51 Miss. 137,
138 (1875) ("fines" includes civil penalties), overruled on other grounds by McLendon v. Pass, 66
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The North Carolina courts followed this common practice in the first years
after the constitutional provision was adopted. 1 1 However, in a 1900 case, the
supreme court, ignoring earlier legislative and judicial practice, introduced a dis-
tinction between fines and penalties:
To our minds there is a clear distinction between a "fine" and a
"penalty." A "fine" is the sentence pronounced by the court for a vio-
lation of the criminal law of the state; while a "penalty" is the amount
recovered-the penalty prescribed for a violation of the statute law of
the state or the ordinance of a town. This penalty is recovered in a
civil action of debt.
112
This distinction, not rooted in the reality of legal practice, is mostly harmless,
because section 7 extends to both fines and penalties so defined. But the distinc-
tion has created some confusion in the meaning of "clear proceeds,"1 13 and it
would be better to reject the distinction and return to the usages contemporane-
ous with the adoption of the constitutional provision.
Distinctions between fines and penalties, on the one hand, and other sorts of
payments, on the other, have been more important than distinctions between
fines and penalties. Because a "penal law" imposes a monetary payment as pun-
ishrnent for its violation, fines, penalties, and forfeitures as a group are distin-
guished as payments imposed as punishment. If a payment, however labelled, is
imposed for some other purpose-usually as compensation to a person or entity
who has been harmed because of the violation-then the constitutional provision
does not apply. Questions of classification arise with actual damages, multiple
and punitive damages, restitution, and tax penalties and interest.
1. Actual damages
The prototypical nonpunitive payment is compensation to a person harmed
by violation of a law. The amount of compensation paid to the victim is based
on the actual harm the victim suffered. Unquestionably, such payments are
Miss. 110, 5 So. 234 (1888). Contra Common Council v. Fairchild, 1 Ind. 315, 318 (1848) ("fines"
include only "pecuniary punishments for breaches of the criminal law").
S11. In Commissioners of Wake v. City of Raleigh, 88 N.C. 120, 123 (1883), the court men-
tioned "fines" imposed by cities for violation of city ordinances. The court characterized these same
payments as "penalties" in Board ofEduc. v. Town of Henderson, 126 N.C. 689, 36 S.E. 158 (1904).
The general assembly also used the three terms interchangeably. For example, one 1877 statute
read as follows:
Every person who shall practice any trade or profession, or use any franchise taxed by
laws of North Carolina without having first paid the tax and obtained a license as herein
required, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall forfeit and pay to the state a
penalty not to exceed twenty dollars, at the discretion of the court, and in default of the
payment of suchfines he may be imprisoned for not more than thirty days, at the discretion
of the court, for every day on which he shall practice such trade or profession, or use such
franchise except in such cases where the penalty is specially provided in this act; which
penalty the sheriff of the county in which it has occurred shall cause to be recovered before
any justice of the peace of the county.
Act of Mar. 10, 1877, ch. 156, § 31, 1876-77 N.C. Laws 282, 296 (emphasis added).
112. Board of Educ. v. Town of Henderson, 126 N.C. 689, 691, 36 S.E. 158, 159 (1900).
113. In Henderson the supreme court distinguished fines from penalties and argued that the
words "clear proceeds" modified only penalties. Id. at 691, 36 S.E. at 159. For a discussion of
correctness of this decision, see infra notes 143-69 and accompanying text.
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neither fines nor penalties in the constitutional sense. 114 When legislatures be-
gan to create statutory rights to compensation in situations in which the com-
mon law gave no remedy at all, such as wrongful death statutes1 15 and workers'
compensation systems, 11 6 the courts had little trouble in analogizing the statu-
tory payment schedules to compensatory damages. 117
2. Multiple and punitive damages
The courts have had greater difficulty with double or treble damages and
with punitive damages. Indeed, the Nebraska courts have held that Nebraska's
version of section 7 prohibits the award to a private plaintiff of either treble
damages or punitive damages, holding that such damages are in fact penalties
and therefore earmarked for the schools. 118 The Nebraska courts arguably are
correct in their characterization, except possibly for some forms of multiple
damages, but their conclusion has quite properly not been accepted in this or
any other state.
Punitive damages present the easier case. The express purpose of punitive
damages is to punish. Although actual loss is a necessary condition to the impo-
sition of punitive damages, actual damages fully compensate that loss. Multiple
damages present a somewhat more complicated case. If the amount of actual
damages is small, multiple damages may be necessary to the economic feasibility
of any private suit for damages. 19 In such a case, multiple damages are at least
partly compensatory in nature. However, it becomes less obvious that the multi-
ple damages are partly compensatory in nature if the basic award of damages is
114. E.g., Livick v. Piqua State Bank, 96 Kan. 5, 149 P. 676 (1915); see Shore v. Edmisten, 290
N.C. 628, 227 S.E.2d 553 (1976) (restitution is payment to party harmed by criminal action as
compensation and therefore is not subject to § 7).
115. The prototype for wrongful death statutes was Lord Campbell's Act, enacted by the British
Parliament in 1846. 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93. The North Carolina wrongful death statute is found in
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984).
116, The first comprehensive workers' compensation statute was enacted in New York in the
early twentieth century. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.10 (1985).
North Carolina's workers' compensation statute is codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122
(1985).
117. E.g., Shaffer v. Rock Island R.R., 300 Mo. 477, 254 S.W. 257, aff'd, 263 U.S. 687 (1923)
(wrongful death); University of Neb. v. Paustian, 190 Neb. 840, 212 N.W.2d 704 (1973) (workers'
compensation).
118. Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960).
119. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 549, 276 S.E.2d 397, 404 (1981). The North Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act provides for treble damages in civil suits against violators of the Act.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1985). In Marshall the court noted that plaintiffs suing under the Act
often had suffered only insignificant actual damages. Therefore, the provision for treble damages
"makes more economically feasible the bringing of an action where the possible money damages are
limited, and thus encourages private enforcement." Marshall, 302 N.C. at 549, 276 S.E.2d at 403-
04.
In Newman v. George A. Fuller Co., 72 R.I. 113, 48 A.2d 345 (1946), the Rhode Island
Supreme Court construed a Fair Labor Standards Act provision for double damages as compensa-
tory rather than penal. The court found a statutory "intent to assure to the injured worker substan-
tial compensation not only for the deprivation of his rightful wages by the employer but also for the
consequent expense, inconvenience and delay incidental to his being compelled to resort to litigation
to obtain those wages." Id. at 117, 48 A.2d at 348.
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large. In such a case, double or treble damages, like punitive damages, begin to
look penal in nature.
If multiple and punitive damages are penal, the laws that impose them are
penal laws, and the payments are therefore penalties in the constitutional sense.
But this recognition does not mean that punitive and multiple damages are un-
constitutional. As the next section on "clear proceeds" demonstrates, because
these penalties do not "accrue to the state," they are not subject to the constitu-
tional appropriation. 120 However, it does legal doctrine little good to strive for
that same end by distorting reality and refusing to recognize multiple and puni-
tive damages for what they are.
121
3. Restitution
The distinction between compensatory and penal payments is well estab-
lished. A potential difficulty arises, however, when the state or some other gov-
ernment claims that it has been harmed by the violations of law. Is the payment
made to the state in such a case compensatory, or is it punitive?
The recent North Carolina case of Shore v. Edmisten 122 addressed these
issues, and the court resolved them in a manner that respected both the purposes
of section 7 and the distinction between compensation and punishment. North
Carolina law permits trial courts to condition probation on payment of fines and
payment of "restitution or reparation to an aggrieved party.' 1 23 In Shore the
Guilford County Clerk of Superior Court held sums of money paid as a result of
thirty-four criminal judgments entered pursuant to this statute. Some of the
judgments directed that the amounts be paid to local police departments or edu-
cational institutions for their normal operating programs. Other judgments di-
rected that the moneys be paid to police agencies as direct repayment of moneys
paid to convicted defendants in drug buys. 124 The clerk brought a declaratory
judgment action against the North Carolina Attorney General and others to
determine the proper disposition, under section 7, of these moneys.
The supreme court held the first group of payments to be improper under
section 7, but the second to be permissible. 125 Restitution to a governmental
agency is proper "wihere the offense charged results in particular damage or loss
to it over and above its normal operating costs.' 1 26 The entire purpose of the
constitutional provision is to divert fines, penalties, and forfeitures from support
120. See infra text accompanying notes 140-69.
121. Compare Barnett v. Atlantic & P.R.R., 68 Mo. 56, 62 (1878) (statute imposing double
damages upon violator is penal law) with Mackie v. Central R.R., 54 Iowa 540, 542, 6 N.W. 723,
724-25 (1880) (statute imposing double damages upon violator is simply a statutory measure of
damages).
122. 290 N.C. 628, 227 S.E.2d 553 (1976).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(d) (1983 & Supp. 1985). At the time Shore was decided the
relevant statute was N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-199 (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 13, 1937, ch. 132,
§ 3, 1937 N.C. Pub. Laws 351, 351-52, repealed by Act of June 23, 1977, ch. 711, § 33, 1977 N.C.
Sess. Laws 853, 899).
124. Shore, 290 N.C. at 636-39, 227 S.E.2d at 560-62.
125. 1d. at 630-31, 227 S.E.2d at 557.
126. Id. at 633-34, 227 S.E.2d at 559.
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of the general operations of government, including the operating costs of locat-
ing and prosecuting those who violate the law. Therefore, only extraordinary
governmental costs can be imposed on a violator; only the payment of extraordi-
nary charges can be characterized as compensating the State.127
4. Tax penalties and interest
North Carolina statutes impose a variety of monetary payments for failure
to comply with different requirements of the revenue laws. Some statutes char-
acterize these payments as "interest," 128 others as a "penalty," 129 and still
others as an additional "tax." 130 Further, some payments are characterized as
both penalty and additional tax.131 All three kinds of payments are often calcu-
lated as a percentage of the amount of tax due.
132
The drafters of section 7 probably gave little consideration to the status of
such payments at the time the provision was adopted, Cooley published his
treatise on taxation in 1876, and in that work he noted that tax penalties were
used infrequently at the state level.' 33 Cooley himself considered both interest
and penalties to be penal in nature because they are imposed as punishment for
failure to comply with tax statutes, and contemporaneous case law generally
follows his lead.' 34 However, context was very important in the early cases.
Because interest was held to be penal in another context does not necessarily
mean it should be penal in the context of section 7.135 It is likely that there
simply was no settled understanding of tax penalties and interest at the time of
section 7's adoption.
Although the state revenue laws do not consistently differentiate between
penalties and interest, the Machinery Act, 136 the local property tax law, is care-
127. Costs present an interesting problem. In civil lawsuits costs are recovered by the successful
litigant along with his or her damages and are considered indemnification for the expense of assert-
ing his or her rights in court. In criminal cases, however, generally only the defendant pays costs
and then only if convicted. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-304 (1981). That only a convicted defendant
pays costs suggests that criminal costs are at least partially penal in character. Possibly some crimi-
nal court costs, such as the court facility fee and the fee supporting the General Court of Justice, can
be characterized as user charges. The law enforcement retirement fee, on the other hand, is used to
subsidize the general operations of government and, under the reasoning of the Shore decision,
would seem to violate the requirements of § 7.
128. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-360(a) (1985) (late payment of property taxes).
129. E.g., id. § 105-236(3) (failure to file state tax return).
130. E.g., id. § 105-236(1) (paying taxes with a bad check).
131. E.g., id. § 105-236(5) (negligent failure to comply with tax laws).
132, Eg., id. § 105-360 ("interest" of 2%); id. § 105-236(3) ("penalty" of 5%); id. § 105-236(2)
("additional tax" of 5%).
133. T. COOLEY, LAW OF TAXATION 310-11 (1876).
134. Id. at 309-15. A representative case is People ex rel Johnson v. Peacock, 98 Ill. 172 (1881).
See also J. GRAY, LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER §§ 1215, 1403 (1906) (characterizing inter-
est as the "ordinary penalty" imposed for nonpayment of taxes). But see High v. Shoemaker, 22 Cal.
363, 370 (1863) (characterizing a 5% charge imposed for late payment of taxes as an inducement to
pay, rather than as a penalty).
135. For example, in People ex rel. Johnson v. Peacock, 98 Ill. 172, 177 (1881), defendant ar-
gued that the 1% monthly interest charged on unpaid taxes was a special law regulating the rate of
interest and was forbidden by the Illinois Constitution. The court responded by declaring the pay-
ment a penalty rather than interest. Id.
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-271 to -395 (1985).
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ful to treat the two words as denoting different concepts. "Interest" is imposed
when a tax payment is late as a charge for the late payment. 137 A "penalty" is
imposed for tax law violations other than late payment, such as for failure to list
property or for payment with a bad check. 138 The interest payment is compen-
satory. The taxpayer has withheld money belonging by law to the government
and has possibly imposed costs on the government in the form of interest paid
for funds borrowed because taxes were late, or interest not earned because tax
payments were not available for investment. The penalty, however, is simply
punishment, and it is explicitly recognized as such. 139 Therefore, if the tax-
related payment is for the wrongful withholding of taxes due the government, it
can be characterized as interest and thereby as compensatory in nature. How-
ever, if the tax-related payment is imposed for some other failure to comply with
the tax laws, it is penal, and it is subject to section 7.
C. "Clear Proceeds"
Section 7 appropriates to education "the clear proceeds of all penalties and
forfeitures and of all fines .... -140 Repeated confusion has attended the inter-
pretation of the phrase "clear proceeds." The North Carolina Supreme Court
has taken alternative approaches to the phrase's meaning and, indeed, in one
important case simply ignored the constitutional language.141 The lack of any
constitutional definition of the term "clear proceeds" and the peculiar phrasing
of the entire clause in which it appears14 2 has hampered the court's efforts in this
area.
Three questions arise under this section. First, does the term "clear pro-
ceeds" modify "fines" as well as "penalties and forfeitures?" Second, which of
the following may be deducted from gross proceeds to arrive at clear proceeds:
costs of collection, cost of prosecution and enforcement, or any amount the gen-
eral assembly may permit? Last, what role does the general assembly have in
the definition of clear proceeds?
The first question requires an answer because of a series of cases decided in
the twenty-five years after the present constitutional language was adopted, cul-
minating in the 1900 case of Board of Education v. Town of Henderson.143 To
137. Id. § 105-360(a) (Machinery Act) (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 5, 1947, ch. 888, 1947
N.C. Sess. Laws 1227).
138. Id. § 105-312(h) (failure to list); id. § 105-357(b)(2) (payment with bad check).
139. W. CAMPBELL, PROPERTY TAX COLLECTION IN NORTH CAROLINA § 704A (2d ed. 1974).
140. N.C. CON T. art. IX, § 7. Although most of the constitutional provisions appropriating
fines, penalties, and forfeitures appropriate only the "clear" or "net proceeds" of those moneys, a few
lack the modifier. E.g., MICH. CONsT. art. VIII, § 9; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8. Despite the missing
modifier, the Virginia court interpreted that State's provision to mean clear proceeds. Southern
Express Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Walker, 92 Va. 59, 64-65, 22 S.E. 809, 810, aff'd, 168 U.S.
705 (1895). The courts of Kansas and Michigan, on the other hand, required that proceeds, with no
deductions, go to schools and libraries respectively. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. State ex rel. Sanders,
22 Kan. 1, 14 (1879); People v. Treasurer of Wayne County, 8 Mich. 392, 393 (1860).
141. See Board of Educ. v. Town of Henderson, 126 N.C. 689, 36 S.E. 158 (1900).
142. "[Ihe clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and of all fines .. " N.C. CONST. art.
IX, § 7.
143. 126 N.C. 689, 36 S.E. 158 (1900).
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understand these cases it is necessary to discuss the once-common qui tam
action. 144
The qui tam action and the closely-related popular action are mechanisms
for private enforcement of penal statutes. Instead of the State bringing a crimi-
nal action against the violator, in a qui tam action a private citizen brings the
violator to task in a civil action. 145 If the private citizen proves the violation, the
punishment is a monetary penalty. The plaintiff keeps some or all of the pen-
alty, while the remainder, if any, goes to the state.1 46 The qui tam action was a
creation of the common law, and because of part-time prosecutors and few state
administrative agencies, it was a popular tool of nineteenth century economic
regulation. 147 Although the plaintiff in such a suit was frequently the person
damaged by the statutory violation, there was no requirement that the plaintiff
be injured; any citizen could, and sometimes did, sue.148 Therefore, the mone-
tary payment imposed on the violator was a penalty, not a form of liquidated
damages.
The first cases decided under section 7, beginning in 1881, involved qui tam
actions. In the first such case, the court unanimously held the constitutional
provision was not intended to inhibit the general assembly's authority to estab-
lish qui tam actions and, in fact, did not apply to that portion of the penalty
awarded to the plaintiff. 149 The court maintained this position for the remain-
der of the nineteenth century, although individual members of the court began
occasionally to dissent from it.150 Then, in 1900, the court decided the Hender-
son case.
In Henderson the school board sought an order directing the town to turn
over the full amount of proceeds it held from fines collected in criminal prosecu-
tions for violation of town ordinances.' 5' The general assembly had expressly
permitted the town to keep those proceeds, and the town argued that the qui
144. A nineteenth century description of the qui tam action is found in 1 MCCLAIN ON CRIMI-
NAL LAW § 7 (1897).
145. Id.; see Middleton v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 95 N.C. 167 (1886) (action may be brought in
name of private plaintiff, without joinder of state).
146. Strictly speaking, if the plaintiff kept the entire amount of the penalty, the action was a
"popular action," while if he or she shared it with the state, it was a "qui tam action." Turner v.
McKee, 137 N.C. 251, 259-60, 49 S.E. 330, 333 (1904) (Walker, J., dissenting). The North Carolina
Supreme Court has not always spoken strictly, however. For example, in Sutton v. Phillips, 116
N.C. 502, 507, 21 S.E. 968, 969 (1895), both actions were labelled qui tam actions.
147. For example, railroads were subject to popular actions for such offenses as refusing to ac-
cept freight, see Code of N.C. vol. 1, oh. 49, § 1964 (1888); discriminating in rates, see id. § 1966;
and not shipping freight received within five days of receipt, see id. § 1967. In Sutton v. Phillips, 116
N.C. 502, 507, 21 S.E. 968, 969 (1895), the court characterized the qui tam action as "an indispensa-
ble means of enforcing the law in many cases."
148. See Turner v. McKee, 137 N.C. 251, 259-60, 49 S.E. 330, 333 (1904) (Walker, J.,
dissenting).
149. See Katzenstein v. Raleigh & G.R.R., 84 N.C. 688 (1881).
150, See Carter v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 126 N.C. 437, 36 S.E. 14 (1900) (violation of require-
ment that railroad accept freight); State ex rel. Godwin v. Caraleigh Phosphate & Fertilizer Works,
119 N.C. 120, 25 S.E. 795 (1896) (violation of requirement that fertilizer bags be tagged); Sutton v.
Phillips, 116 N.C. 502, 21 S.E. 968 (1895) (one judge dissented) (violation of weights and measures
law); State ex rel. Hodge v. Marietta & N.G.R.R., 108 N.C. 24, 27, 12 S.E. 1041, 1042 (1891)
(Avery, J., concurring) (violation of requirement that railroad annually report to governor).
151. Henderson, 126 N.C. 689, 36 S.E. 158 (1900).
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tam cases supported the general assembly's right to do so. 152 The court dis-
agreed. Although the court's result arguably was correct, its reasoning was
absurd:
[T]hat line of cases [upholding the qui tam actions] ... does not mate-
rially affect the case at bar. Those cases were actions for penalties
where the "clear proceeds" are given to the school fund, and this is an
action for fines collected. Mark the difference in the language of the
Constitution: with regard to penalties, it says, the "clear proceeds";
while it says "all fines collected in any county" shall belong to the
common school fund, and there is no ground for deducting anything
from it.153
This rationale, as Chief Justice Faircloth pointed out in a concurrence, is non-
sense. 154 The court's quotation disingenuously left out the "of" before "all
fines." When that word is returned to the clause, it is manifest that "clear pro-
ceeds" must modify fines as much as it does penalties if the language is to make
sense.
Justice Furches, the author of the Henderson opinion, misinterpreted the
reason for not subjecting qui tam penalties to the school fund and ignored the
consistent interpretation of the preceding twenty years-an interpretation that
the court returned to just a few years later.155 The 1868 Constitution appropri-
ated to the irreducible education fund "the net proceeds that may accrue to the
State ... from fines, penalties, and forfeitures."' 15 6 This provision did not re-
quire that such moneys accrue to the State; it simply required that those that did
accrue be allocated to education. Although the 1875 amendment changed the
language, it does not appear to have been intended to affect the moneys subject
to the allocation. There is no evidence to suggest that the 1875 Convention
intended any change as to which fines, penalties, or forfeitures were subject to
the provision. Indeed, evidence from newspaper accounts of that Convention
suggests that the only intention was to shift allocation of the resource-un-
changed-from State to local control. A newspaper summary of the change
described it as follows: "Leaves fund raised from fines, penalties and forfeitures
in counties instead of forwarding to Treasurer State Board of Education." 15 7
The newspaper reported that one opponent to the change disliked "the proposi-
tion that the money collected from fines, forfeitures, etc., should be applied in
the particular counties in which they were collected. He looked upon common
schools as a public charity, and all the funds for their support should be rateably
distributed throughout the whole state."158 The major floor amendment pro-
152. Id. at 693-95, 36 S.E. at 159.
153. Id. at 695-96, 36 S.E. at 160.
154. Id. at 696, 36 S.E. at 161 (Faircloth, C. J., concurring).
155. See State v. Maultsby, 139 N.C. 583, 51 S.E. 956 (1905); infra text accompanying notes
166-69.
156. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 4 (amended 1875) (emphasis added).
157. The [Carolina] Era (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 30, 1875, at 2, col. 6; The Daily Constitution
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 27, 1875, at 3, col. 3.
158. Daily Sentinel (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 27, 1875, at 1, col. 4. The delegate was Jacob Bowman
from Mitchell County. Bowman was answered by Thomas Jarvis, from Pitt County, who later
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posed to the committee's draft, which was unsuccessful, would have provided
"that the moneys obtained from the fines in the different counties be used as a
distributive instead of an irreducible fund." 159 The amendment would have re-
turned the moneys to the State government, but distributed the whole amount
each year rather than the income only. Throughout these newspaper accounts
there is absolutely no indication of any change in the fines, penalties, or forfeit-
ures to which the provision applied. Indeed, the accounts make complete sense
only if the drafters intended no change in the moneys at issue.
The case law during the remainder of the nineteenth century reflects this
understanding. In Katzenstein v. Raleigh & Gaston Railroad,160 the first case
decided under section 7, the court distinguished between those penalties "that
accrue to the State"-using the 1868 language in 1881-and those that are given
to the plaintiff in a qui tam action. 16 1 Only "penalties that accrued to the State"
belonged to the school fund. The court reaffirmed this interpretation fourteen
years later in Sutton v. Phillips.162 Citing Katzenstein and the cases decided
under Missouri's comparable constitutional provision, 163 the court suggested
that "the object of the Constitutional provision was not to prohibit qui tam ac-
tions in [the] future, but simply to provide that all penalties inuring to the state
should go to the school fund."' 164
Thus, the consistent understanding before Henderson was that the Consti-
tution required only that the clear proceeds of all fines, penalties, and forfeitures
that came to the State be given to the school fund. The Constitution did not
require that all such moneys come to the State in the first instance. Therefore,
qui tam penalties did not violate the Constitution because they never accrued to
the State. t65 The court in Henderson misread the rationale of these earlier cases.
served as Governor from 1879-1885. Although Bowman was a Republican and Jarvis a Conserva-
tive, the issue does not seem to have been joined on partisan lines. Bowman's motion to table the
proposal, which lost 83-23, received the support of 10 Conservatives and 13 Republicans. It seems
more likely that the issue was drawn on regional lines between those counties that received more
when they retained what they collected and those that did not. Sixteen of the twenty-three votes for
Bowman's motion came from representatives of foothills or mountain counties. N.C. JOURNAL OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 145; see infra note 159.
159. The Daily News (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 29, 1875, at 1, col. 3; see N.C. JOURNAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 146. The amendment was proposed by A. C. Avery, a
Conservative from Burke who later served as a member of the North Carolina Supreme Court from
1888 to 1897. Avery was quoted as noting that the "bill did not meet the wishes of the people of the
West." The Daily News (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 29, 1875, at 1, col. 3.
160. 84 N.C. 688 (1881).
161. Id. at 693. "State," in this context, appears to include local as well as state government.
The distinction drawn is between moneys accruing to public agencies and moneys accruing to pri-
vate parties. With the exception of a passing reference in Commissioners of Wake v. City of Raleigh,
88 N.C. 120, 122 (1893), the early ordinance cases, see infra text accompanying notes 206-11, indi-
cated that ordinance penalties did accrue to the "State."
162. 116 N.C. 502, 21 S.E. 968 (1895).
163. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 7; see supra notes 57-59, 65 and accompanying text.
164. Sutton, 116 N.C. at 505, 21 S.E. at 968. The court reaffirmed this line of cases in State ex
rel. Carter v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 126 N.C. 437, 36 S.E. 14 (1900) (court rejected, on basis of
precedent, defendant's argument that penalty awarded in qui tam action should go to school fund).
165. This reasoning also explains why punitive and multiple damages, although penalties, do not
violate the constitutional provision. These damages never accrue to the State. See supra text accom-
panying notes 118-21.
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Its opinion, as quoted above, is based on the idea that the penalties imposed in a
qui tam action are subject to the constitutional appropriation and that the "clear
proceeds" are the gross amount of these penalties minus the plaintiff's share.
In 1905 the court, in State v. Maultsby,166 returned to the earlier under-
standing. In Maultsby the court reiterated that the Constitution affected only
those penalties that accrued to the State 167 and distinguished fines from penal-
ties in a more satisfying way than had the Henderson opinion. "From their very
nature, being punishment for violation of the criminal law, [fines] are imposed in
favor of the State and belonging to the State, the General Assembly cannot ap-
propriate the clear proceeds of fines to any other purpose than the school
fund." 168 That fines, by "their very nature," belong to the State may or may not
be historically sound,169 but the court's statement does support a distinction
between civil and criminal penalties that respects the language of section 7.
Civil penalties, of course, had historically been given to private parties; they had
not accrued to the State. The distinction also assists in answering the other two
questions posed above.
It was not until after Henderson that the court discussed the meaning of
"clear proceeds," and its first discussions were at least partially dicta. In School
Directors v. Asheville 170 the court suggested that clear proceeds might be deter-
mined by deducting from gross proceeds "a reasonable commission for collect-
ing the fines." The court noted the statute that gave the clerk a five percent
commission on all fines and penalties paid.171 This limited notion of permissible
deductions from gross proceeds was echoed later the same year in Maultsby.
1 72
Indeed, the Maultsby court was perhaps even more restrictive, stating that
"clear proceeds" is the "total sum less only the sheriff's fees for collection
166. 139 N.C. 583, 51 S.E. 956 (1905).
167. Id. at 584, 51 S.E. at 956.
168. Id. at 585, 51 S.E. at 956.
169. In School Directors v. City of Asheville, 137 N.C. 503, 50 S.E. 279 (1905), the court had
stated as follows:
It is common custom to give either, all, or a part of penalties to the person aggrieved or any
person who will sue for the same, whereas it would introduce a novelty into our law to
distribute a fine imposed for the violation of the criminal law and bring many strange and
dangerous innovations into our criminal jurisprudence.
Id. at 511, 50 S.E. at 282.
The distinctions between civil and criminal proceedings, drawn in Maultsby and School Direc-
tors, may not have been as sharply understood in the mid-nineteenth century. For example, the
following section from the 1854 Revised Code of North Carolina exhibits elements of both criminal
and civil proceedings:
If the justice or constable shall be denied a view of the receipt, the offender shall forfeit and
pay one hundred dollars, one half for the State, and the other half for the constable or any
other who will sue for the same; and the justice, if the denial be to him, shall forthwith
issue his warrant for the recovery thereof; and if to a constable, he shall arrest the party
and carry him before some justice of the peace, who shall issue his warrant for the penalty,
and determine the cause.
Rev. Code of N.C., ch. 99, § 47 (1855).
170. 137 N.C. 503, 512, 50 S.E. 279, 282 (1905).
171. Id. at 512, 50 S.E. at 282. At that time clerks of court were compensated by fees rather
than by salary.
172. Maultsby, 139 N.C. 583, 51 S.E. 956.
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... " 1173 Both cases, however, suggest that only charges directly attributable to
collection of the fine are deductible.
The court of appeals facially accepted this understanding in its second deci-
sion in the Cauble v. City of Asheville parking penalty litigation by holding that
only items bearing "a reasonable relation to the costs of collection" could be
deducted from total proceeds. 174 However, the court's discussion indicated that
it had an overly expansive notion of collection costs. The earlier cases 175 each
used charges arising only after a court had levied the fine or penalty being col-
lected as examples of collection costs. The court of appeals, however, conceded
that the collection costs of parking penalties "often surpass the amounts col-
lected." 176 Such a result is possible only if the court envisioned not only collec-
tion costs as defined in earlier cases, but also enforcement and prosecution
costs-especially the costs of checking parking meters and of ticketing viola-
tors. 177 If these are collection costs, then so are the law enforcement costs of
investigating and charging the defendant in any crime and the State's costs in
prosecuting that crime. In its most recent Cauble decision, the supreme court
recognized the implications of the court of appeals' opinion.178 The supreme
court accepted that collection costs were indeed deductible, but specifically de-
nied that enforcement costs also were deductible. 179
If the appropriate deductions from total proceeds of both fines and penalties
are collection-related costs only, what then is the general assembly's role? Two
points are clear. First, case law makes clear that the general assembly may not
permit the deduction of costs unrelated to collection.180 Second, it is implicit in
the North Carolina cases and consistently upheld in other states that the general
assembly does have the power to define those collection-related costs that are
deductible. 18 ' The unanswered question is whether any deduction is possible in
the absence of legislative permission.
None of the nineteenth century North Carolina cases raised a "clear pro-
ceeds" issue, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court did consider the legislative role
173. Id. at 585, 51 S.E. at 956. The Iowa Supreme Court took an even narrower view of permis-
sible deductions, limiting them to the costs of converting tangible property to cash.
The framers of the constitution probably contemplated that fines might be made payable in
county orders or state warrants, or that there might be a forfeiture of property as a fine for
a breach of some penal laws, and therefore required that the clear proceeds of such should
be applied to the several school districts.
Woodward v. Greeg, 3 Greene 287, 288 (Iowa 1851).
174. Cauble v. City of Asheville, 66 N.C. App. 537, 543, 311 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1984), aff'd, 314
N.C. 598, 336 S.E.2d 59 (1985).
175. E.g., Maultsby, 139 N.C. at 583, 51 S.E. at 956; School Directors, 137 N.C. at 503, 50 S.E. at
279.
176. Cauble, 66 N.C. App. at 543, 311 S.E.2d at 894.
177. Asheville sought a definition of permitted deductions that included all costs associated with
the police officers and meter checkers who issued parking citations. Asheville argued that deduc-
tions should include wages, training expenses, uniform expenses, and the cost of equipment, includ-
ing motor vehicles. Record at 23, Cauble.
178. 314 N.C. 598, 336 S.E.2d 59 (1985).
179. Id. at 604, 605, 336 S.E.2d at 63, 64.
180. Maultsby, 139 N.C. at 583, 51 S.E. at 956.
181. E.g., Gunn v. Mahaska County, 155 Iowa 527, 136 N.W. 929 (1912).
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in defining clear proceeds in 1881. In State ex rel. Guenther v. Miles18 2 the court
held that no deductions were permissible in the absence of legislative action. In
1912 the Iowa Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion.18 3 Arrayed against
this position is the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which in its second Cauble
decision clearly indicated that the courts could permit deductions despite legisla-
tive inaction.1
8 4
No clear answer to this question emerges from the cases arising contempo-
raneously with adoption of section 7, which leaves the matter to competing
claims of public policy. On balance, it seems preferable for the courts to permit
deductions for collection costs, even if the general assembly has taken no action.
The supreme court has made clear that the Constitution permits deduction of
collection costs.18 5 The general assembly could, as a matter of State policy, limit
the amount of such deductions or deny them altogether, but if it has not done so,
the court's rulings should retain their precedence. Therefore, if collection costs
are clearly identifiable, a court should permit their deduction from total pro-
ceeds, as long as such a deduction does not impair legislatively established
policies.
D. "Collected in the several counties"
Michigan's Constitution allocates all fines "collected in the several counties
and townships" for public library purposes.'8 6 In 1914 Michigan's Attorney
General suggested that the constitutional provision did not apply to a penalty
assessed in a corporate quo warranto proceeding brought by the Attorney Gen-
eral in the state capital because the proceeding was not one that occurred among
the "several counties."' 187 He argued that the Constitution's requirement ap-
plied only to proceedings "local in character."' 188 Although no court seems to
have directly accepted this argument, its implications are important and it there-
fore deserves discussion. If the argument is accepted, it would be possible for
various state agencies that collect fines or penalties in proceedings in Wake
County, North Carolina, and perhaps elsewhere, to argue that the resulting
moneys are not subject to section 7 because the moneys were not, and could not
be, collected in the several counties. Such an argument could involve such mon-
eys as tax-related penalties collected by the North Carolina Department of Rev-
enue,' 8 9 antitrust penalties collected by the North Carolina Attorney
182. 52 Wis. 488, 9 N.W. 403 (1881).
183. Gunn, 155 Iowa at 527, 136 N.W. at 929.
184. Cauble, 66 N.C. App. at 540, 311 S.E.2d at 892. After the court of appeals' decision, the
general assembly did in fact define permissible deductions as "actual costs of collection, not to ex-
ceed ten percent of the amount collected." Act of July 17, 1985, ch. 779, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws
879, 879 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-437 (1983 & Supb. 1985)). The supreme court gave
this statute a prospective application only. Cauble, 314 N.C. at 605 n.1, 336 S.E.2d at 63 n.l.
185. Cauble, 314 N.C. at 604, 336 S.E.2d at 63.
186. MICH. CONsT. art. VIII, § 9.
187. 1915 MICH. A-r'y GEN. REP. 155.
188. Id. at 158.
189. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-236 (1985).
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General, 190 and environmental penalties paid to the North Carolina Environ-
mental Management Commission. 19 1 The argument should be rejected.
To advance the Michigan argument in North Carolina would misrepresent
the effect of the 1875 changes to the Constitution. Monetary payments pro-
tected by this argument clearly would have been subject to the 1868 provision:
they are fines, penalties, or forfeitures that accrue to the State. As has been
argued earlier, the only changes made or intended by the 1875 amendments were
first, to appropriate the moneys to current school operations rather than to a
permanent school fund, and second, to leave the moneys in the county of collec-
tion rather than send them to Raleigh for redistribution. 192 There is no evidence
that the Convention intended to diminish the revenues subject to the constitu-
tional provision, and the nineteenth century judicial evidence reinforces the no-
tion that no such change was intended.
193
For the most part, the kinds of payments that would be protected by the
Michigan argument did not exist in 1875. Little state administrative structure
existed to enforce and collect such payments. What contemporary evidence
there is, however, cuts against the Michigan argument. Section 1959 of the 1883
Code required railroads to make an annual report to the Governor, 194 and sec-
tion 1960 imposed a 500 dollar penalty for failure to do so. 195 An action to
recover the penalty was to be brought in the name of the State in Wake
County.196 Thus, it was not a penalty that could be collected in the "several
counties."
Section 1960 was the subject of State ex rel. Hodge v. Marietta & North
Georgia Railroad, 197 in which the court held that only the State, and not a pri-
vate citizen, could sue for this penalty.19 8 Writing for himself and three other
members of the five-member court, Justice Clark noted that "here the statute
imposing the penalty provides for its recovery by the state, and the Constitution
devotes such penalties and forfeitures to the school fund."' 199 Because the dispo-
sition of the penalty was not before the court, the statement was dicta. How-
ever, the statement clearly indicates an assumption that there was nothing
unusual about this penalty that would cause it to be treated differently from
other penalties accruing to the state.
Furthermore, the concentration of penalty and fine payments in Wake
County is more apparent than real. For example, an administrative agency in
Raleigh assesses the various environmental penalties. If the penalties are not
190. Id, § 75-15.2.
191. Id. § 143-215.69(a) (1983) (water quality); id. § 143-215.17(b) (water use); id. § 143-
215.36(b) (dam safety); id. § 143-215.91(a) (discharge of oil or other hazardous substances).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 60-81.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 155-59.
194. Code of N.C. vol. 1, ch. 49, § 1959 (1883).
195. Id. § 1960.
196. Id.
197. 108 N.C. 24, 12 S.E. 1041 (1891).
198. Id at 26, 12 S.E. at 1041.
199. Id.
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voluntarily paid, however, the agency must sue for the penalty in either the
county in which the violations took place or the county in which the violator
resides. 200 Should the agency have to sue for the penalty, it obviously would be
collected in one of the several counties, and a voluntarily paid penalty could be
traced to the same county. The same sort of analysis could distribute any tax-
related penalties to the county in which the taxpayer resided.20 1 There would
remain a few penalties or fines paid for violations not traceable to a particular
county, and Wake County would likely benefit from these. However, these
would not be many in number and should not be cause to divert the moneys
collected from the Wake County school fund.
E. Local Ordinance Violations
Until 1872 the only method available to cities to enforce their ordinances
was to impose a penalty on violators and collect the penalty in a civil action.
20 2
In 1872 the general assembly enacted the statute now codified in North Carolina
General Statutes section 14-4,203 making violation of any city ordinance a mis-
demeanor. 2° 4 From that time on cities could rely on this general criminalization
of ordinances for enforcement, or they could in addition impose civilly-collected
penalties. The most recent modification to this system was made in 1972 when
the general assembly authorized cities to impose civil penalties in lieu of the
criminal remedies of section 14-4, as well as in addition to those criminal
remedies.20
5
The early case law in this area distinguished, for purposes of section 7, be-
tween civil and criminal enforcement of city ordinances. In Commissioners of
Wake v. City ofRaleigh 20 6 the county sought to recover moneys collected by the
city through the enforcement of city ordinances. The court held that the mon-
eys were not subject to the constitutional provision, giving the three following
200. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.17(b)(4) (1983).
201. In State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Rose, 78 Kan. 600, 604, 97 P. 788, 790 (1908), the Kansas
Supreme Court, sitting in the state capital, fined Rose for contempt for ignoring an order issued in a
quo warranto action to vacate the office of Mayor of Kansas City. The opinion held that the fine
should go the the county in which Kansas City was located-the site of the offense-rather than the
county in which the state capital was located-the site at which the fine was imposed.
202. See, e.g., Commissioners of Louisburg v. Harris, 52 N.C. 281 (1859) (ordinance assigning
fine of not less than, nor more than, $20 held void for vagueness); Commissioners of Washington v.
Frank, 46 N.C. 436 (1854) (penalty imposed on slaves who violated town ordinance prohibiting
disorderly conduct).
203. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-4 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
204. Act of Feb. 12, 1872, ch. 195, § 2, 1871-72 N.C. Pub. Laws 344, 344. This Act simply
made violation a misdemeanor. When the Act was included in the Code of 1883, maximum sanc-
tions were set at a $50 fine, 30 days in jail, or both, where they remain today. Code of N.C. vol. 2,
ch. 62, § 3820 (1883). This legislation was necessary because local governments have no independ-
ent authority to classify behavior as criminal. See Henderson, 126 N.C. at 691, 36 S.E. at 159 ("A
municipal corporation has the right, by means of its corporate legislation, commonly called town
ordinances, to create offenses, and fix penalties for the violation of its ordinances, and may enforce
these penalties by civil action; but it has no right to create criminal offenses.").
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-175 (1982). Counties first received general ordinance-making
power in 1969, Act of Mar. 6, 1969, ch. 36, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 23, repealed by Act of May 24,
1973, ch. 822, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1233, 1233, and now have the same enforcement choices as
cities, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-123 (1983).
206. 88 N.C. 120 (1883).
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reasons: First, the moneys did not accrue to the state; second, they were not
collected for a breach of a penal law; and last, they were not collected by county
officers.207 The court's discussion of the issue was brief, and no distinction was
made between civil and criminal actions. Seventeen years later the court decided
Henderson,20 8 in which plaintiff school board sought only those moneys col-
lected in criminal actions pursuant to the predecessor of section 14-4. In its
opinion, which upheld the school board's claim, the court recounted the history
of enforcement of city ordinances and drew a distinction between civil and crim-
inal enforcement. Criminal enforcement resulted in fines that belonged to the
school fund, as such actions were brought under a penal law of the state.
209
Civil enforcement, however, resulted in penalties that the town could retain.
This was not because the ordinances were not penal, but rather because there
was no violation of a penal law of the state.210 The court distinguished between
laws enacted by state government and ordinances enacted by town government;
only the laws fit the constitutional language, and therefore only the former were
subject to the constitutional appropriation.
211
It was against this background that the city of Asheville was sued in 1977.
Like most North Carolina cities, Asheville imposed a small civil penalty, usually
one dollar, on violators of its overtime parking ordinances. The city expected
violators to pay the penalty voluntarily, and most violators did. Payment was
made to the city, and the city retained the money. Asheville did not bring civil
actions for unpaid penalties because the amounts involved were normally too
small. Rather, because the city had not used its power to exclude these ordi-
nances from section 14-4, it would proceed under that statute against persons
who did not voluntarily pay the penalty. Plaintiff in the Asheville litigation-a
taxpayer's class action-sought an order directing the city to turn the amounts
voluntarily paid to it for parking violations over to the local school system on
the ground these penalties were subject to section 7.212
In Cauble v. City ofAsheville 213 a divided supreme court agreed with plain-
tiff. The majority began with the distinction drawn in Henderson between civil
and criminal actions and with the requirement of that case that criminal fines go
to the school fund. 214 The majority then declared that if the underlying offense
was criminal any money collected from the violator was therefore a fine.215 Be-
cause Asheville had not excluded its parking ordinances from the coverage of
section 14-4, the court argued that violation of the ordinance was a breach of a
penal law of the state, and the money paid-although called a "penalty" and
207. Id. at 122.
208. 126 N.C. 689, 36 S.E. 158 (1900).
209. Id. at 692, 36 S.E. at 159.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Cauble, 301 N.C. at 341, 271 S.E.2d at 259.
213. 301 N.C. 340, 343, 271 S.E.2d 258, 260 (1980). The majority's and minority's opinions
were reiterated in Cauble, 314 N.C. at 598, 336 S.E.2d at 59.
214. Henderson, 126 N.C. at 691, 36 S.E. at 159.
215. Cauble, 301 N.C. at 344, 271 S.E.2d at 260.
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paid voluntarily-was a fine for constitutional purposes.2 16
The dissent argued that it was not the nature of the offense that was crucial
but the nature of the proceeding in which the money was collected.2 17 Although
agreeing that a fine is a sum exacted from a person guilty of a misdemeanor, the
dissent argued that guilt had to be proved in a proper proceeding and the fine
had to be imposed by a court. 2 18 The payments made to Asheville did not result
from criminal proceedings. They were voluntary payments that were made at
the inception of a civil proceeding to avoid the criminal proceeding.
219
Based on the North Carolina cases decided in the thirty years after the 1875
Convention and on contemporaneous cases involving local ordinances decided in
other states, the dissenters in Cauble were clearly closer to the original under-
standing of section 7.
This section has noted that the court in Henderson held that civil penalties
collected for violation of town ordinances were not subject to section 7 because
such ordinances were not penal laws of the state.220 This result, and indeed this
rationale, was mirrored in the nineteenth century cases from other states that
decided whether moneys collected as a result of local ordinance violations must
go to education. Save in Nebraska, where peculiar constitutional language gave
that state court no choice,22 1 each of these early decisions held that towns could
retain these moneys collected as a result of local ordinance violations. The Indi-
ana court reached this conclusion by a unique route, holding that "penal laws"
meant "criminal laws" and that an action to enforce a town ordinance was not a
criminal action.222 Three other courts, however, each acting in the late 1870s,
excused local ordinance moneys from the constitutional appropriation on the
same ground as the Henderson court. These courts held that there is a distinc-
tion between statutes or laws, on the one hand, and ordinances on the other, and
the constitutional provision applied only to the statutes or laws.
223
In all of these early decisions, in North Carolina and elsewhere, the focus
was on the nature of the proceeding and not on the offense. In People ex rel.
Fennell v. Common Council,224 for example, the Michigan court noted that cer-
216. Id. at 344, 271 S.E. at 261.
217. Id. at 346, 271 S.E.2d at 261 (Exum, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 347, 271 S.E.2d at 262 (Exum, J., dissenting).
219. Id.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 208-11.
221. State ex rel. School-Dist. v. Heins, 14 Neb. 477, 16 N.W. 767 (1883). The Nebraska consti-
tutional provision stated, in part, that
all fines, penalties, and license money arising under the rules, by-laws, or ordinances of
cities, villages, precincts, or other municipal subdivision[s] less than a county, shall belong
and be paid over to the same respectively. All such fines, penalties, and license money shall
be appropriated exclusively to the use and support of the common schools in the respective
subdivisions where the same may accrue ....
NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5. No other state's constitutional provision expressly mentioned local
ordinances.
222. Common Council v. Fairchild, 1 Ind. 315 (1848).
223. People ex rel. Fennell v. Common Council, 36 Mich. 186 (1877); State ex rel. Rosenstock v.
Swift, 11 Nev. 128 (1876); Village of Platteville v. Bell, 43 Wis. 488 (1878).
224. 36 Mich. 186, 190 (1877).
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tain offenses under the town ordinance involved in its case were also offenses
under state law. Because the town ordinances imposed different punishments,
however, they were excluded from the constitutional appropriation. 225 This no-
tion of parallel enforcement techniques was found in North Carolina as well.
The North Carolina statutes in the late nineteenth century often provided for
enforcement both by criminal and by civil proceedings, with the civil penalty
often allocated to a private prosecutor.226 More to the point, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court in 1905 noted that "[a] party violating a town ordinance
may be prosecuted by the State for the misdemeanor and sued by the town for
the penalty. ' 227 In the context of the case, the court clearly understood that the
town kept the penalty when it sued the violator. This statement, of course, di-
rectly supports the position of the Cauble dissent and opposes that of the court's
majority. 228
F. Infractions
The 1985 general assembly introduced the concept of infractions into North
Carolina law. In legislation that became effective July 1, 1986, certain offenses,
primarily involving motor vehicles, are classified as infractions rather than mis-
demeanors. 229 The intent behind the legislation was to decriminalize those of-
fenses. With such an offense a person is found "responsible for an infraction"
rather than "guilty of a misdemeanor," and the punishment is labeled a penalty
rather than a fine. 230 Two aspects of this legislation raise section 7 issues that
should be considered briefly.
First, the legislation provides that persons found responsible for an infrac-
tion are to pay the proceeds of any penalties to the appropriate county to be used
for schools. 231 The initial question is whether this appropriation is constitution-
ally mandated or whether some portion of the penalty could be legislatively allo-
cated to some other use. The proper answer is that these penalties are subject to
225. Id.
226. The following sections of the Code of 1883 are representative: § 52 prohibits setting fire to
woods, Code of N.C. vol. 1, ch. 7, § 52 (1883); § 53 enforces that prohibition through both a $50
penalty collected in a qui tam proceeding and by making violation a misdemeanor, id. § 53; § 678
requires the clerk of superior court to collect and remit moneys, upon incorporation of business
corporations and provides for enforcement by both qui tam action and criminal prosecution for a
misdemeanor, id. § 678; and § 1882, which prohibits a public officer from acting without a bond,
provides for a forfeiture by the officer and for criminal enforcement, id. ch. 46, § 1882.
227. School Directors v. City of Asheville, 137 N.C. 503, 510, 50 S.E. 279, 281 (1905).
228. In response to the most recent decision in the Asheville litigation, Cauble, 314 N.C. at 598,
336 S.E.2d at 59, several cities have amended their ordinance codes to decriminalize city parking
ordinances. See, e.g., News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 17, 1986, at 22C, col. 1. Other cities
had modified their codes after the first supreme court decision. See eg., 1 CARRBORO, N.C., CODE
§ 1-10, at 1-3; id. § 6-32, at 6-23 to -24. If a city denies itself the ability to use criminal prosecution
to collect parking penalties that are not voluntarily paid, then the justification for treating volunta-
rily paid moneys as criminal fines is lost. In the terms of the majority's opinion in Cauble, the
underlying offense is now only the city ordinance. Because the ordinance is not a penal law of the
State, the city will be able to keep the moneys paid as a result of the ordinance's violation.
229. Act of July 15, 1985, ch. 764, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1111, 1111 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-3.1 (Supp. 1985)).
230. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3.1 (Supp. 1985).
231. Id.
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section 7 and that only collection costs may constitutionally be deducted from
total proceeds.
A law that is enforced as an infraction is clearly a penal law. A monetary
payment is imposed upon proof of its violation, and the penalty is clearly in-
tended to be punitive rather than compensatory. Furthermore, the penalty ac-
crues to the state. Just as criminal proceedings are prosecuted by state officials,
so are infraction proceedings. There is no private prosecutor to whom the pen-
alty might be awarded, and so the proceeds of infraction penalties should be
treated just as are the proceeds of criminal fines.2
32
Second, the legislation amended North Carolina General Statutes section
14-4 to provide that violation of a local ordinance "regulating the operation or
parking of vehicles" constitutes an infraction rather than a misdemeanor.2 33 Be-
cause the proceeds of infraction penalties are appropriated to education, the
question is whether this change concerning parking ordinances decided the
Cauble litigation by requiring that all penalties imposed for parking violations
go to the school fund.234 The clear answer is no.
The proper reading of city and county choice on parking and vehicular
ordinances is that they may be enforced by infraction penalties or by civil penal-
ties. Both North Carolina General Statutes section 153A-123, 235 which applies
to counties, and North Carolina General Statutes section 160A-175, 23 6 which
applies to cities, set out enforcement methods for local ordinances and begin
with cross-references to section 14-4. Both statutes contain statements indicat-
ing that unless the governing board of the county or city takes further action,
local ordinances are to be enforced pursuant to section 14-4.237 The next sub-
section of these statutes then authorizes the use of civil penalties.238 The infrac-
tion legislation amends only the subsections that cross-reference to section 14-4,
leaving the civil penalty subsection unchanged. 239 The double use of "penalty"
is unfortunately prone to confusion, but the distinctions remain clear. Because
232. The legislation provides that "[tihe proceeds of penalties for infractions are payable to the
county in which the infraction occurred for the use of the public schools." Id. Although this may
have been unintended, the language might be thought to indicate that there are to be no deductions
from total proceeds.
233. Act of July 15, 1985, ch. 764, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1111, 1111 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-4 (1981 & Supp. 1985)).
234. The majority in the most recent Cauble decision seemed to think the infraction legislation
had some impact on the questions raised in the Cauble litigation. In a long footnote the majority
summarized the legislation, but then noted that it was inapplicable because it would not be effective
until July 1, 1986. Cauble, 314 N.C. at 604 n.1, 336 S.E.2d at 63 n.l. As the discussion in the text
demonstrates, the legislation is inapplicable, but the reason is that it has nothing to do with civil
penalties.
235. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-123 (1983 & Supp. 1985).
236. Id. § 160A-175 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
237. Id. § 153A-123(b) (1983 & Supp. 1985); id. § 160A-175(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
238. Id. § 160A-175(c) (1982 & Supp. 1985) reads:
An ordinance may provide that violation shall subject the offender to a civil penalty to
be recovered by the city in a civil action in the nature of debt if the offender does not pay
the penalty within a prescribed period of time after he has been cited for violation of the
ordinance.
239. In both cases, the language of the subsections referring to § 14-4 was merely changed from
providing that violation of an ordinance is a misdemeanor, as provided by § 14-4, to providing that
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the penalties involved in Cauble were civil penalties, the infraction legislation
had no impact on the issues of that litigation.
III. CONCLUSION
The premise of this Article has been that article IX, section 7 of the North
Carolina Constitution, which appropriates the clear proceeds of certain fines,
penalties, and forfeitures to county school funds, should be interpreted in the
manner of a statute, with a careful regard for the legislative intent of its drafters.
Furthermore, that intent is most likely to be discovered through a better under-
standing of the historical circumstances surrounding insertion of the provision
in the Constitution and by a close reading of those court cases that interpreted
the provision soon after its adoption. Reference to contemporaneous cases inter-
preting similar provisions in other state constitutions enhances this judicial evi-
dence. The better understanding of section 7 that this search for intent provides
can then be the basis for interpreting the provision's application to practices that
did not exist when it was adopted.
Using this procedure, this Article has reached a number of conclusions.
First, "penal laws" are those that impose a monetary punishment upon viola-
tors. Second, the terms "fines," "penalties," and "forfeitures" include any pay-
ment imposed for the purpose of punishment, even those associated with damage
awards to private litigants. To this point, the reach of the constitutional provi-
sion is extensive. However, the third conclusion is that the provision includes
only those fines, penalties, and forfeitures that accrue to the state; punitive mon-
etary payments that are paid directly to private litigants are unaffected by its
requirements. Fourth, of the total proceeds that do accrue to the state, only
collection costs, as permitted by the general assembly, may be deducted before
the moneys are turned over to local school systems. Fifth, the provision applies
to any penalty that accrues to state government, not just those that are suscepti-
ble to collection in the several counties. Last, section 7 does not extend to civil
penalties voluntarily paid to local governments by ordinance violators, even
when the city or county had the power, under the ordinance, to criminally pros-
ecute the violator.
These conclusions, if generally accepted, will increase significantly the
amounts of money coming to local school systems through section 7. The great-
est practical impact would be on civil penalties now imposed by or for the benefit
of a variety of state agencies, which are now retained by state government.
2 40
violation of an ordinance is a misdemeanor or infraction, as provided by § 14-4. See id. §§ 153A-
123(b), 160A-175(b).
240. The total proceeds collected by the State from civil penalties is not now readily available.
The report on civil penalties mandated by the 1986 general assembly, see supra text accompanying
note 15, was not made. Telephone interview with Linda Powell, Fiscal Research Division, North
Carolina General Assembly (Oct. 7, 1986). The general assembly's Fiscal Research Division has
therefore requested state agencies to report to it in the Fall of 1986 on the amounts of penalties
collected by each, but not all have yet responded. Id. The magnitude of state civil penalty collec-
tions is suggested, however, by the amount of penalties collected in 1985-86 for environmental viola-
tions, which was $136,339. Telephone interview with Barry K. Sanders, North Carolina Office of
the State Budget (Oct. 7, 1986).
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The direct impact on local government revenues would be smaller, probably
affecting only those penalties imposed for late-listing of property for taxes,
which are now retained by local governments.2 41 Concededly, this general re-
sult would cause some minor disruption of present arrangements and prevent
some attractive funding relationships, such as was proposed for the state-level
RICO in 1985.242 Indeed, given current attitudes toward education and the
large amounts of state and local moneys that are appropriated for education, the
constitutional appropriation of fines, penalties, and forfeitures might now be an
anachronism. However, the proper way to deal with a constitutional anachro-
nism, if this be one, is by straightforward amendment of the Constitution and
not by judicial interpretation that balances the provision against competing poli-
cies and thereby risks distortion and confusion of the constitutional text.
241. The amount of late-listing penalties collected by local governments is also difficult to deter-
mine, because most local governments do not distinguish in their financial reports between such
penalties and interest collected for late payment of taxes. However, the magnitude is suggested by
the amount collected by the city of Raleigh, which was $154,000 in 1985-86. Telephone interview
with Perry James, Deputy Finance Director, city of Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 25, 1986).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
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